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ABSTRACT
This study statistically tests the two dominant theories
of early American economic growth and development--staples
theory and Malthusian theory— in a study of new land acquisi­
tion in the colonial Chesapeake for the years 1660-1706.
The theories are examined first to discern the key
elements of each, drawing upon comparative studies of the
antebellum North and South and colonial New England. These 
key elements— population density for Malthusian theory and 
tobacco prices for staples theory— are then combined in one 
econometric model and subjected to a rigorous hypothesis test 
which ultimately rejects the staples model in favor of the 
Malthusian model of land acquisition.
However, additional analyses of population changes, 
immigration, and tobacco price fluctuations indicate that the 
relationship between economic and demographic variables in the 
colonial Chesapeake is complex and not at present sufficiently 
understood. In particular, the study identifies the need to 
further examine the effect of immigration and population 
pressure in early American economic and demographic develop­
ment .
The study of new land acquisition also reveals that, in 
late seventeenth century Virginia, small patentees and large 
patentees responded to the same pushes and pulls. Planters, 
large and small, were more concerned with maintaining a steady 
income level than making quick profits. Most patentees did 
not use the patenting process to speculate in land, but rather 
accumulated land through a variety of methods. What land 
speculation and engrossment there was did not as a rule 
preclude general land availability.
A study of population density shows that the number of 
acres per tithable increased dramatically up to the 1670s, 
levelled off in the 1680s, and declined in the 1690s, but 
always maintained a level high enough to preclude any subsis­
tence crisis.
All tests reject the notion that an economic transforma­
tion occurred in late seventeenth century Chesapeake, which 
puts into question syntheses of the colonial Chesapeake which 
revolve around such a transformation.
BRUCE CHANDLER BAIRD, JR. 
DEPARTMENT OF AMERICAN STUDIES
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
NEW LAND ACQUISITION IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1660-1706 
A TEST OF THE MALTHUSIAN AND STAPLES HYPOTHESES
INTRODUCTION
The social sciences have contributed much to the most 
recent developments in the historiography of early America. 
Whether called "social science history," "new social his­
tory," "new economic history," or "quantitative history," the 
more rigorous and demanding methodologies of the social 
sciences have opened up heretofore reticent historical sources 
and have begun to make sense of the massive amounts of 
historical data which have randomly survived from the 
colonial era. However, in contrast to the significant role 
of social science "methodology," social science "theory" has 
played a rather negligible role in this "new" history of the 
colonial era. Traditionally atheoretical, history for the 
most part continues to focus on the unique and particular of 
each historical period.
Nevertheless, colonial historians have adopted two 
theoretical approaches from the social sciences— the Malthu­
sian (frontier) approach and the staples (export-led) ap­
proach--^ help put in perspective the overall growth of 
colonial America. Each of these theories has various propo­
nents, but neither approach has been able to claim total 
support. Demographic historians have tended to support the
2
3Malthusian hypothesis and economic historians the staples 
hypothesis. There also exists a North-South split with New 
England historians favoring a Malthusian explanation and 
Chesapeake historians favoring a staples explanation.
Neither of these theories has been subjected to any 
rigorous test in the study of early America. "Almost all the 
work in the field now completed and most of that currently 
under way is descriptive, aimed at measurement and narration, 
at getting the facts right, rather than at econometric 
analysis" (McCusker 6). The purpose of this thesis will be 
to test these two models in an econometric analysis of land 
acquisition in the colonial Chesapeake.
Although social science theory could help colonial 
historians take maximum advantage of the historical data which 
already exists, most historians would argue that insufficient 
data survives from the colonial era to test social science 
theories. The cliometricians, who have contributed so much 
to testing our conclusions about other historical eras, have 
shied away from the colonial era with its paucity of numerical 
data. This paucity may have been true previously, but the 
tremendous explosion in data gathering in recent years has 
made this no longer the case. For the colonial Chesapeake, 
reasonably good annual data is available for tobacco prices, 
population, and patented land acreage. In any case, his­
torians should not shrink from subjecting their theories to 
test for fear of incomplete data. Adopting the rigorous rules
4of hypothesis testing from the social sciences, the historian 
simply should test the quality of the data at hand rather than 
bemoan the absence of perfect data.
A good way to test any social science theory is to deve­
lop, from the general theoretical model, a specific mathema­
tical model which can be tested using standard statistical 
tools. For the colonial era, we could develop two models 
representing the two theoretical approaches and put each to 
the test and see which gives better statistical results. How­
ever, although colonial historians may believe one of the two 
models offers a better explanation, all recognize that 
economic and demographic forces are not unrelated. The two 
models are, in reality, just ways of simplifying historical 
processes which are due to many varied forces: economic,
demographic, military, political, ideological, socio-cultural, 
biological, etc.
Since most historians recognize that both demographic 
and economic forces are always at work in society, the true 
theoretical model should incorporate both forces. The two 
theories thus can best be tested within the context of one 
model. Statistical tests may show that one set of forces is 
more significant in certain situations, thus tending to 
support one theory over the other. But we should be careful 
to not let the data dictate the model. The analysis of land 
acquisition in the colonial Chesapeake can be only one test 
of the two theories. Much work will remain to be done before
5we will have an accurate theoretical model of early American 
development. The results of this analysis will at least help 
to reveal something of the complex interrelationship between 
economic and demographic forces.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In The Economy of British America. 1607-1789. McCusker 
and Menard discuss the two traditional approaches to explain­
ing the growth and development of colonial America:
The Malthusian, or frontier, approach locates the 
central dynamic of early American history in 
internal demographic processes that account for the 
principal characteristics of the colonial economy: 
the rapid, extensive growth of population, of 
settled area, and of aggregate output combined with 
an absence of major structural change. The second 
tradition, usually described as the staples approach 
or, more generally, as an export-led, or "vent for 
surplus," growth model, attaches fundamental 
importance to the export of primary, resource­
intensive products. It argues that the export 
sector played a leading role in the economy of 
British America and maintains that the specific 
character of those exports shaped the process of 
colonial development. (18)
As McCusker and Menard admit, "both approaches are essential 
to understanding the colonial economy, and often it is in the
6
7relationships between population growth and external demand 
that answers to the most interesting questions will be found" 
(19) .
Land and population play a central role in both theories, 
although each looks at land and population differently. The 
Malthusian approach focuses on population pressure on the 
land. The staples approach focuses on land and population as 
the two key factors of production. In order to develop an 
overall theoretical model for land acquistion, we need to 
examine more closely the factors which affect demand for land 
according to the two theories.
Staples Approach
Although the staples approach has influenced much of the 
work on the colonial Chesapeake, we can benefit more from a 
comparative analysis of the excellent, staples-influenced 
research done on the cotton economy of the antebellum South. 
Spurred on by the seminal work of Douglass North, "new 
economic historians" such as Peter Temin, Gavin Wright, Peter 
Passell, and Stanley Lebergott have added greatly to our 
understanding of the antebellum South. This work readily 
provides an excellent framework for developing a "staples" 
explanation of land acquisition in the colonial Chesapeake.
It is unfortunate that the "new social historians" of 
the colonial Chesapeake have paid so little attention to the
8"new economic history" of the antebellum South for the two 
economies shared many striking features. Douglass C. North 
emphasizes the importance of cotton in the U.S. economy of 
the antebellum era. "Cotton was strategic because it was the 
major independent variable in the interdependent structure of 
internal and international trade" (67). A similar claim can 
be made for tobacco in the colonial Chesapeake. In both, land 
was abundant and labor was scarce, with capital and technology 
playing relatively minor roles. Both were dominated by farms 
basically self-sufficient in foodstuffs which produced 
essentially one market commodity— tobacco or cotton. This 
staples environment favored the growth of large plantations 
employing unfree labor— slaves and indentured servants in the 
colonial Chesapeake and slaves in the antebellum South. The 
regional economies were rocked by the vagaries of the dominant 
European economy.
A general examination of land acquisition and settlement 
patterns on a local, regional, or national basis reveals 
similar patterns for both the colonial Chesapeake and the 
antebellum South. North's statement that "plantations 
extended up navigable waterways, and as the land closest to 
water transport was taken up, plantations developed farther 
from these transport arteries" (64) could just as easily have 
been made about tobacco as about cotton plantations. Rivers 
provided the major means of transportation and cities were few 
and far between. The Southern frontier was always the fastest
9growing region of the South, both in population and land 
acquisition. The southern farmer was Virginia's posterity, 
each succeeding generation pushing further and further to the 
south and west.
Douglass C. North placed land acquisition at the heart 
of the cotton economy. "The secular decline in the price of 
cotton between 1818 and 1845 reflected the fact that, despite 
the enormous growth in demand..., the supply of cotton grew 
even more rapidly. This was primarily a result of the 
expanded acreage (although yields were much higher in the 
Southwest) that came about with the great migration into 
western lands between 1815 and 1839" (123-125). Cotton "booms" 
were precipitated by the exhaustion of available land capacity 
which led to higher cotton prices. "During each period of 
expansion, millions of acres of new land were purchased from 
the government for cotton production. Once this land had been 
cleared and a crop or two of corn planted to prepare the soil, 
the amount of cotton available could be substantially 
increased" (71).
Peter Temin contested North's assumptions that changes 
in cotton production could be directly linked to new land 
sales. Temin instead believed that "cotton-growing capacity 
was determined by the quantity of labor, not the quantity of 
land" (468). "If we assume that there was an upper bound to 
the amount of land a given number of workers could farm 
efficiently, then the speed at which new land could be settled
10
would depend on the growth of the potential labor force, i.e., 
the Southern population" (468). Overall, Temin found that the 
production of cotton was fairly insensitive to cotton prices.
Gavin Wright examined Temin1s contentions and showed that 
cumulative land sales and a time trend (to reflect population 
growth) explained changes in cotton production better than 
population growth alone (115). Population growth alone did 
not necessarily lead to expansion; also required was a
willingness to migrate to new lands. "Cumulative land sales 
serve as an approximate index of the number of such migration- 
decisions which have been made,...as a reflection of the
extent to which expansion occurred" (112). Overall, though,
Wright found that "Temin's description of the course of events 
is more correct than North's" (116-7) and that there is no 
evidence of "a periodic 'exhaustion of capacity' as an
identifiable phenomenon in Southern development" (117).
Although there is disagreement as to the effect of land 
acquisition on staple production, for North, Temin, and Wright 
(and all followers of the staples model) , there is no dis­
agreement that staples price determined demand for land. 
"While there had been little incentive to buy and clear new 
land for cotton during the period of low prices, rising prices 
triggered a land boom in the South" (North 73) . Whether 
cotton capacity was exhausted or British demand increased, the 
subsequent higher cotton prices would have led to greater 
demand for land (Temin 4 66). Wright found that "a distributed
11
lag function, with weights assigned to past cotton prices 
declining geometrically with time1' provided the best explana­
tion of land sales (112,116).
Gavin Wright states well the staples model's position on 
land acquisition: "it was not the physical supply of labor
which influenced decisions on settling land, but the expected 
returns" (112). Likewise, "the price of land was not the 
major obstacle to migration; the question facing a potential 
migrant was whether the returns from farming the new land were 
likely to be great enough to compensate for the expense of 
migration, settlement, purchase of equipment and bringing land 
into cultivation" (112). Thus the staples model determines 
that land acquisition will be mostly a function of staples 
price, the prime determinant of expected returns in staples 
theory.
The demographic forces associated with Malthusian theory 
are not usually considered in "staples" analysis of land 
acquisition. Gavin Wright, in his study of annual land sales 
in the cotton South does include "a time trend to reflect the 
secular rate of migration" (112). Unfortunately he does not 
report the significance of the time trend coefficient in his 
final model, although he indicates that including the time 
trend improves all of his price elasticities. (112,116). 
Stanley Lebergott has done the most sophisticated economic 
analysis of land sales in the antebellum South. Lebergott's 
model "presumes two basic determinants of the demand for
12
land— the expected money return and the effective supply 
price. The expected monetary return is a function of the 
expected income from land, the riskless rate of return, 
expected capital gains from land, and the variability of 
expected income. The supply price of land is a function of 
the supply price of federal land (encompassing the explicit 
and implicit prices and the terms of sale), the Graduation Act 
of 1854, and the quality of land, in particular the role of 
Indian cessions" (197) . In this most thorough economic study, 
Lebergott totally ignores demographic forces.
Although the work on the antebellum South provides much 
guidance for developing a specific staples model of land 
acquisition in the colonial Chesapeake, such a model will rest 
upon a great body of previous staples-influenced research into 
various aspects of the economy of the colonial Chesapeake. 
As McCusker and Menard state, "booms and busts in the tobacco 
trade have been the subject of intense study, particularly in 
the early colonial period. These studies provide powerful 
evidence that the Chesapeake economy was export led, for the 
fluctuating fortunes of the tobacco industry reverberated 
throughout the entire economy and affected the pace of 
immigration, the advance of settlement, the extent of oppor­
tunity, government policy, experiments with other staple 
exports, the spread of manufacturing, and the level of 
material well-being in the colonies" (125). Probably the most 
"testable" explanation of the staples model for the colonial
13
Chesapeake can be found in Paul G. Clemens's The Atlantic 
Economy and Colonial Maryland's Eastern Shore:
Boom and bust characterized the economic lives of 
Chesapeake tobacco planters. These cycles of 
prosperity and recession depended on the relation­
ship among immigration, the price of tobacco, the 
production of the staple, and the consumption of 
the crop in England. Booms began with an upswing 
in the price of tobacco...Generally, production 
increases followed soon after a rise in the price 
of tobacco, as English merchants, encouraged by 
favorable market conditions, shipped large numbers 
of laborers to Maryland and Virginia. Because 
tobacco cultivation required little land, planters 
quickly cleared new fields and set immigrant 
laborers to work (30).
Clemens's model indicates clearly a strong positive rela­
tionship between tobacco prices and immigration, new land 
acquisition, and tobacco production.
As straight forward as this interpretation of the tobacco 
economy is, staples enthusiasts are often contradictory about 
planter behavior. Clemens notes that "the price of tobacco 
remained strong enough to drive up the level of production," 
but, in the same paragraph argues, "as prices continued to 
fall, the pressure to increase farm production and maintain 
profit levels intensified" (35) . Menard also recognizes this
contradiction between the staples thesis and actual planter 
behavior:
Indentured servants were a short-term investment; 
returns had to be realized within a few years of 
purhase if they were to be realized at all. During 
periods of high tobacco prices, planters may have 
tried to boost production by purchasing servants in 
hope of making quick profits; when tobacco prices 
were low planters perhaps avoided investments that 
demanded immediate returns. This is an attractive 
argument, but it does not fit the available 
evidence. Prices for indentured servants were not 
consistently higher in boom times than in depres­
sions. Small planters, furthermore, had fixed 
expenses and debts to pay; when tobacco prices 
declined they felt pressures to expand production 
in order to maintain the income of their farms. 
(1975,349-351)
According to both Menard and Clemens, only the English tobacco 
merchants were efficient capitalists and only the merchant- 
controlled supply of servants and credit saved the colonial 
Chesapeake from economic disaster. Contrary to staples 
theory, planters left to themselves would have continued to 
expand production through good times and bad.
But this analysis of planter behavior is not new. Lewis 
C. Gray said the same in his seminal analysis of Agriculture
15
in the Southern United States to I860:
While producers1 prices were subject to great 
fluctuations, the production of tobacco was essen­
tially inelastic. This was partly due to the fact 
that it was the sole money crop. .. Practically the 
only alternative of the planters, therefore, was to 
resort to a greater degree of self-sufficiency. 
Inelasticity of production was partly due also to 
the characteristic inability of farmers to control 
production because of seasonal fluctuations. A 
considerable part of the crop, moreover, was 
produced by backwoods farmers, employing largely 
their own labor and producing with little reference 
to conditions of prices and costs... Returns from 
tobacco were employed to meet charges on account of 
capital, usually of indebtedness, or to satisfy 
wants of planters. Consequently it was observed 
that low prices, far from inducing voluntary 
limitation of production, actually operated for a 
time to spur planters, especially those deeply in 
debt, to extra efforts to enlarge their product. 
(276)
Overall, "proof" of the staples model for the colonial 
Chesapeake rests on rather meager evidence. Much of the 
analysis has been restricted to descriptive graphs and tables 
with no rigorous statistical analysis. Some historians have
16
noted the strong correlation between changes in taxable 
population and tobacco prices (Clemens 53) . Others have noted 
the correlation between unindentured servant registration and 
tobacco prices (Menard,1973,326-8; 1977,363-5; 1988, 115-117; 
Walsh,197,26-27). Others have even noted a strong correlation 
between premarital sex and tobacco prices (Gladwin 63-65). 
However, no rigorous statistical test has yet proved the 
staples model works in the colonial Chesapeake.
On the other hand, there is at least one rigorous statis­
tical test which tends to cast doubt on the staples thesis. 
Charles Wetherell is one of the few scholars who have criti­
cized the general acceptance of the staples model for the 
colonial Chesapeake. Using a Box-Jenkins time series ap­
proach, Wetherell found only a very weak, if any, relationship 
between English tobacco imports and farm tobacco prices 
(1984,203). Wetherell argues that "customary behavior among 
some planters (cultivate as much tobacco as possible because 
the opportunity exists) could account for any volume of 
production as easily as instrumental behavior among other 
planters (buy more land and labor to plant more tobacco 
because the price is rising)" (1984,209).
Wetherell uses English import data as the best data ex­
tant to test the staples thesis and he is justified in using 
the production data for a test since the staples promoters 
have so often quoted the import data in their behalf (e.g., 
Clemens 35). However, I do not believe these English import
17
data (basically Port of London data) serve as a good proxy for 
Chesapeake tobacco production. Intuitively, I would expect 
that Chesapeake tobacco production would have showed much 
greater variation than that indicated by the English import 
data. As Wetherell himself states, the "arguably important 
Scottish trade" is ignored. It is possible the London market 
was a relatively fixed demand market and all other production 
was diverted to other British or even other European ports.
Wetherell sees the central focus of the staples thesis 
in the relationship between price and production. 
"[I]ncreases in European demand pushed up prices, which led 
in turn to increased investment in land and labor, and 
eventually to greater production" (201). As he states, "these 
arguments are all potentially verifiable. The quantitative 
relationship between tobacco prices, land sales, immigration, 
and perhaps even slave purchases could be examined if the 
relevant data were available" (201). Although a test of the 
relationship between price and production may be the only 
"true" test of the staples model, the lack of any good proxy 
for production makes such a test, at present, impossible. 
However, this does not mean that the staples model can not be 
tested; reasonably good data exists for both land and popula­
tion. Considering the necessary intermediate link between 
price and production, a test of the relationship between price 
and land acquisition will serve adequately. Such a test is 
the purpose of this study.
18
Malthusian Approach
In contrast to even this rather haphazard testing of the 
staples thesis by economic historians, as McCusker and Menard 
note, "the Malthusian model is largely untested" (33). 
Historians who have worked with New England data, stressing 
the importance of demographic factors in the development of 
early America, have done the brunt of the work. Daniel Scott 
Smith, Edward M. Cook, Jr. , Kenneth A. Lockridge, Philip J. 
Greven, Jr., and Darrett B. Rutman have explored many of the 
interrelationships between population size, density, growth 
and wealth inequality.
Of these New England studies, Rutman1s examination of 
the peopling of New Hampshire towns provides the most expli­
cit model for testing the Malthusian approach. Rutman 
intertwines demographic, economic, and socio-cultural forces 
in a model which tries to capture the "systematic link between 
the level of economic opportunity and migration" in Anglo- 
America (1975,273-4). Rutman hypothesizes a homeostatic 
governor, "continually reading the atmosphere of the system, 
specifically the population density, and testing density 
against an optimum established by the level of economic 
opportunity. When the governor senses that density is below 
optimum, it triggers in-migration much as a thermostat sensing 
a temperature below its setting triggers a heating device;
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when the governor senses density above the optimum, it calls 
for out-migration" (1975,275). Rutman recognizes that 
socio-cultural attitudes towards mobility affect this "optimum 
density."
Rutman's focus on the effect of the "level of economic 
opportunity" on optimum density stresses the importance of 
the move to "economic opportunities other than agricultural." 
As long as the economy remained basically agricultural, the 
"optimum density" should remain constant unless attitudes 
toward mobility change. Rutman finds that "optimum density" 
was independent of soil type or topography, implying that 
agricultural efficiency also had little effect, although he 
admits that his determination of optimum density was based on 
towns located in the southeastern part of New Hampshire where 
land "waste" was minimal (1975,291).
Richard A. Easter1in, studying demographic changes in 
the antebellum North, troubled by the "lack of a plausible 
explanation of the mechanisms by which these variables ['land 
availability' or farm population density] exert their effect" 
(71), proposes a mechanism which links migration, fertility, 
and population density through farm acreage values. 
Easterlin's model, stimulated by Greven's work on colonial 
Andover as well as the work of Yasuba, Forster, and Tucker on 
the prime effect of population density on fertility, "centers 
on farmers' concern for giving their children a start in life" 
and the intricate inverse relationship between acreage values
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and return on farmers' capital (71).
Cheap acreage induces in-migration and encourages 
high fertility among new settlers...This, in turn, 
leads to a rapid rise in population density, driving 
up farm acreage values. The rise in acreage values, 
however, reacts adversely upon the rate of popula­
tion growth, slowing it down, by lowering both net 
migration and fertility. As the rate of population 
growth and increase in density slow down, the rise 
in farm values moderates, thereby slowing down the 
declines in fertility, migration, and population 
change. This goes on, back and forth, until total 
population, fertility, net migration, and farm 
acreage values stabilize at a level commensurate 
with the area's potential. (72)
Easterlin finds that such a model explains "closely linked 
patterns of economic and demographic change that have reoc­
curred in state after state," North and South (72-73).
Chesapeake historians have attempted to derive indepen­
dent estimates of an "optimum density." Most of the work has 
focused on the minimum amount of land needed to both keep a 
laborer busy year-round and, at the same time, maintain soil 
quality. In what has been called the "Chesapeake system of 
husbandry," a planter cleared some land, planted tobacco for 
a few years until the soil was depleted and then allowed the 
tobacco land to return to forest until the soil became fertile
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again (at which point it could be cleared and replanted in 
tobacco). At any point, particularly on older farms, a 
planter could have as much as four-fifths of his land in some 
stage of reforestation. Since one laborer could work only 
about 3-4 acres a year and could plant a tobacco crop about 
3 years in a row on the same soil before depletion, and since 
it took about 2 0 years for reforestation, each laborer 
required at least 20 acres (Earle 29) . However, since not all 
land was arable and with extra requirements for wood, pas­
turage, and foodstuffs, 11'50 acres of land for every working 
hand'11 was considered the norm among 18th century planters 
(Kulikoff,1986,48; Earle 210).
Does the Malthusian model imply that a crisis is even­
tually reached, as Lockridge believes happened in 18th century 
Massachusetts (1971,468-482)? Not if a "governor" as des­
cribed by Rutman and Easterlin existed. If pockets of 
over-crowding existed, it was because atttitudes towards 
mobility were highly negative. As long as attitudes toward 
mobility were flexible, such a crisis need not have been 
reached for there truly was an abundance of land and few 
barriers to new land acquisition in both the colonial or 
antebellum era. Malthus himself understood the uniqueness of 
America, where the means of subsistence could grow geome­
trically with the population (Smith,1980,15).
However, Lorena Walsh has shown that socio-cultural atti­
tudes towards mobility may have changed as the Chesapeake
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society matured. "Once natives [Anglo-Americans] became a 
majority among adult men in the community, outmigration 
slowed...Family ties became increasingly important and appear 
to have outweighed economic considerations when a creole man 
debated whether to stay or leave" (Walsh,1987, 98). For
Charles County, Maryland, such a transition had occurred by
1705. Such a transition likely occurred in many other mature 
counties. According to the Malthusian hypothesis, this change 
in attitudes would have raised the optimum density (population 
per square mile) and lowered the demand for new land over 
time.
So stated, Malthusian theory is quite at odds with 
staples theory. Staples price fluctuations do not represent 
true changes in the "level of economic opportunity" and, thus, 
do not affect "optimum density." For the study of land 
acquisition, as long as attitudes towards mobility did not 
change and the economy remained agricultural, land demand was 
only a function of population density.
Transformation Synthesis
The best attempt to synthesize the recent work on the 
colonial Chesapeake is Allan Kulikoff's Tobacco and Slaves. 
Concentrating mostly on the 18th century Chesapeake, Kulikoff 
takes advantage of the staples-influenced work of the 17th 
century to demonstrate a transition from dominant economic to
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dominant demographic forces around the end of the 17th 
century.
Both population growth and the rise of tobacco 
production rested upon the creation of new planta­
tion households, a process increasingly tied to the 
availability of land. During most of the seven­
teenth century, the price of tobacco and English 
economic conditions determined the rate of household 
formation...The increase in the percentage of native 
white adults at the end of the seventeenth century 
reduced the direct impact of the tobacco trade and 
increased the significance of land availability for 
household formation" (1986,45).
For the greater part of the 18th century, Kulikoff believes 
that the colonial Chesapeake fit the Malthusian model.
Kulikoff is trying to synthesize the staples-directed 
work of Chesapeake scholars with the Malthusian-directed work 
of the New England scholars to show that once a native white 
population established itself, demographic factors became 
dominant. In Kulikoff's staples view of the 17th century 
Chesapeake, demographic factors did not dominate because most 
immigrants could not afford to pay their passage and so came 
on the demand of Chesapeake planters who were driven by the 
desire for tobacco profits. High tobacco prices led to 
greater demand for indentured servants and slaves and thus 
increases in population. Demographic factors like fertility
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and mortality, which dominated the 18th century Chesapeake 
population growth, were independent of the tobacco economy.
Kulikoff's Chesapeake transition is basically the same 
as Clemens's Eastern Shore "transformation":
While through the 1680s economic life had revolved 
around immigrant male planters who had a penchant 
for buying and selling labor and land as the market 
dictated, by the first decade of the new century the 
economy centered on native-born families who had 
settled into the routine of making a living from 
plantations inherited from an earlier generation of 
colonists...As land filled up, opportunity con­
tracted, immigration shifted elsewhere, the poor 
left, and second- and third-generation landowners 
took over. Such a process— settlement, crowding, 
and out-migration-occurred in virtually every 
English colony. The rate of the process depended 
primarily on the population the land could support, 
which in turn reflected the relationship (or lack 
of it) of local agriculture to the market (77). 
What Clemens identifies as a local transformation at the turn 
of the century, Kulikoff extrapolates to the whole Chesapeake 
at the same time period.
However, Kulikoff does not really test either model. 
Most of his analysis is of a general descriptive nature. 
Although Kulikoff relies heavily on the concept of "optimum
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density," there is no statistical test of his assumption of 
" ' 50 acres of land for every working hand1’1 as optimal. 
Indeed, his graph of acres per taxable person would seem to 
indicate that Virginians continued to far exceed that optimum 
density throughout the 18th century (1986,49). Although 
Kulikoff provides an interesting synthesis of the two models, 
he does not really test economic against demographic forces 
in either the 17th or 18th century. He does not show the 
interrelationship between the two forces. It was either one 
or the other.
Higher tobacco prices could just as easily have caused 
people to move to the frontier in the 18th century as in the 
17th century. Population density could have worked as the 
controlling mechanism in both centuries. Kulikoff's tacit 
acceptance of the staples model in the 17th century rests on 
the untested assumption that immigrants came to the Chesapeake 
when "times were good in the Chesapeake, 11 although he also 
admits they might have come over because conditions were 
"depressed in England" (1986,45). Clearly whether immigrants 
came to the Chesapeake in "good" or "bad" times is a critical 
test of the staples model, but another test which has yet to 
be done.
The Clemens/Kulikoff synthesis model fails most drama­
tically to explain migration in the colonial Chesapeake. In 
comparison with Rutman and Easterlin's single set of factors 
to explain both in-migration and out-migration, the Clemens/
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Kulikoff model uses one set of factors to explain in-migration 
and another set to explain out-migration. (People immigrated 
because tobacco prices were high but emigrated because tobacco 
prices were low.) Kulikoff posits that 17th century out­
migration was unique because "optimum density" had not been 
reached anywhere in the 17th century with additional tidewater 
land so readily available. But just how different was the 
motivation of the farmer settling on the 17th century tide­
water frontier compared to the farmer settling on the 18th 
century piedmont frontier or the 19th century southwest 
frontier? Were immigrants, European or American, so much 
different from emigrants? Did this behavioral transformation 
occur simultaneously throughout the Chesapeake, equally in new 
frontier and older settled counties? Clearly, we need to know 
much more about the overall process of migration, both in- 
migration and out-migration, before the economic and demo­
graphic history of the colonial Chesapeake can be synthesized.
Anita H. Rutman, without resorting to either the Mal­
thusian or staples models, believes there was much more regu­
larity in migration decisions. Each new area went through 
similar changes in its transformation from a frontier region 
to a settled community, but there was no simultaneous change 
throughout the Chesapeake. Opportunity was great for first 
arrivals. "The wealthiest brought property accumulated else­
where in with them, yet both those who entered with little and 
those who entered with much tended to prosper as land values
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rose by virtue of settlement, and later arrivals provided 
ready markets for excess cattle and food crops. On an indi­
vidual level, however, fortunes varied" (15). Those who were 
less successful "either left to try elsewhere or, particularly 
after the turn to slavery, increasingly settled for relative, 
but consumer-oriented, poverty" (15).
Although the advent of slavery modified this local 
process somewhat, the process remained basically the same in 
Rutman's Middlesex County, Kulikoff's Prince George's County, 
Clemens's Eastern Shore, Beeman's Lunenburg County and else­
where in the colonial Chesapeake. Indeed, as noted by Carr 
et al (1988,34), the process is the same as that identified 
by Wilbur J. Cash as the central theme of the Old South. "For 
the history of the South throughout a very great part of the 
period from the opening of the nineteenth century to the Civil 
War (in the South beyond the Mississippi until long after that 
war) is mainly the history of the roll of frontier upon 
frontier— and on to the frontier beyond" (Cash 4). This is 
a much more appealing hypothesis than Kulikoff's transforma­
tion theory.
There is nothing in Anita Rutman's argument which is con­
trary to either the staples or Malthusian model. Opportunity 
could be defined in terms of the tobacco market or optimum 
density. "Push" or "pull" factors could be dominant. How­
ever, Rutman's argument runs counter to attempts to synthesize 
the colonial Chesapeake by saying the 17th century was staples
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and the 18th century Malthusian. No such transformation for 
the entire Chesapeake can be supported by the available data. 
What is required is a more complex model entailing both 
economic and demographic factors which explains why the two 
centuries were so similar, not two separate models which 
explain why they were so different.
For the study of land acquisition in the colonial Chesa­
peake, the two models have very different implications. The 
staples model hypothesizes that land acquisition is a function 
of opportunity in the tobacco economy (tobacco prices, labor 
productivity, transportation changes, price of land, etc.). 
The Malthusian model hypothesizes that land acquisition is a 
function of population density. Expressed either as a normal 
density (persons per square mile) or inverse density (acres 
per person), the Malthusian approach predicts increased 
population pressure on land drives people to move to less 
dense areas where land can be more easily obtained. The 
staples model predicts that people acquire land when staple 
prices rise. Whereas the staples model states that economic 
forces precede demographic forces (higher tobacco prices leads 
to increased immigration to and reduced emigration from the 
Chesapeake), the Malthusian model states that these economic 
forces have a mere coincidental relationship. The staples 
model focuses on "pull" factors and the Malthusian model 
focuses on "push" factors.
As McCusker and Menard state, the implications of the
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two models are testable. However, rarely, if ever, are
demographic and economic forces given equal status in any 
objective test. Economic historians tend to lump demographic 
forces into a time trend and demographic historians tend to 
ignore short-term economic effects. The "true" model must 
include both economic and demographic factors because both 
influence every aspect of the economy. Only when tested within 
a combined model will historians be able to determine which 
model, staples or Malthusian, better explains early American 
development.
Tests of such a model may show that economic forces were 
more significant in one region (e.g., the West Indies) and 
demographic forces more significant in another region (e.g., 
New England). Or such tests may show that one set of forces 
tended to prevail across all regions and time periods. Or 
perhaps they will prove, as Daniel Scott Smith claims, that 
"if staples provided the engine of change, demography acted 
as the governor of the system" (1982,281). Identification of 
the relationship between economic and demographic forces may 
not be so simple as identifying one as the engine and the 
other as the governor. More likely, both economic and demo­
graphic forces were the engine of change and the governor lay 
in the complex interrelationship between the two forces.
CHAPTER II 
NEW LAND ACQUISITION 
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE
To develop a model of new land acquisition in the colo­
nial Chesapeake, we need to examine the various theory-derived 
factors which might affect demand for land and to determine 
what data might be available to measure each factor. But 
before examining these "independent" variables, we first 
should examine the "dependent variable"— new land acquisition- 
-in its historical context.
Land Patents and "New" Land Acquisition
How was land acquired in the colonial Chesapeake? 
According to the Browns, who equated economic democracy in 
Virginia with the availability of cheap land, the "common man" 
could "buy land from one of the land speculators or land 
jobbers who had received a large grant from the King, and of 
course he could buy land from others who had acquired it by 
whatever means. In addition, he could inherit or receive land 
as a gift, marry someone who owned land, or lease land for a 
term of years or on a life lease" (11) . Or else, for the
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payment of certain fees (including the purchase of necessary 
headrights or treasury rights), he could get a patent to land. 
"Men who could not pay the small amount necessary to acquire 
land, or preferred to buy a slave as some did, could always 
lease land in Virginia" (Brown 23). For the study of "new" 
land acquisition (land not previously owned) in the colonial 
Chesapeake, we are primarily interested in the colonial land 
patents.
Analyses of land acquisition have been relatively 
neglected in the colonial Chesapeake compared to the antebel­
lum South and even to colonial New England. As Kenneth 
Lockridge has stated, "land and time must be the touchstones 
of any enquiry into the social evolution of early America: 
land because the economy was overwhelmingly agricultural and 
because land has been both the symbol and the essence of 
American opportunity; time because there was so much of it" 
(1971,468). Greven's study of Andover revolved around the 
interrelationships between population, land, and the family. 
Douglass C. North, Peter Temin, Gavin Wright, Peter Passell, 
and Stanley Lebergott have all added to the understanding of 
land acquisiton in the antebellum South. Land acquisition 
studies in the colonial Chesapeake have been restricted to 
Kulikoff's look at taxable acreage totals in the 18th century 
and as part of several local studies by Kevin Kelly, Carville 
Earle, Michael Nicholls, Ransom True, Paul CLemens, and Lorena 
Walsh among others.
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The absence of any overall analysis of new land acqui­
sition in the colonial Chesapeake is even more marked because 
excellent, fairly complete sets of land patent records exist 
for all of the colonies usually included as part of colonial 
Chesapeake studies: Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina. 
For the purpose of this study, we will focus on only one 
Chesapeake colony: Virginia.
All of the great Virginia historians from Bruce and 
Wertenbaker to Craven and Morgan have recognized the impor­
tance of the Virginia land patents, which Harrison called 
"Virginia's most precious surviving muniment of her past" (7) . 
Indeed, with the destruction of many colonial and county 
records by the ravages of both time and war, the Virginia land 
patents are "the only [record] that has any claim at all to 
comprehensive coverage" (Craven,1971,9). The task has been 
made relatively easy with the publication of an excellent 
series of abstracts Cavaliers and Pioneers by Nell Marion 
Nugent, Custodian of the Virginia Land Archives from 1925 to 
1958. The first volume was published in 1934 (covering 
Patents Book Nos. 1-5 [1623-1666]), but unfortunately her
abstracts of Book Nos. 6-8 (1666-1695) were not published
until 1977, followed by Book Nos. 9-14 (1695-1732) in 1979.
This greatest source of information on colonial Virginia 
has been severely underutilized. Major studies focusing on 
the land patents have been restricted to determination of the 
average size of land patents from 1626-1700 (Bruce 1:527-532),
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the social mobility of indentured servants (Wertenbaker 74-81; 
Voorhis 70), and the annual number of headrights as an index 
of immigration (Wertenbaker 35-36; Craven,1971,14-16; 
Morgan,1973,363-5). Most of these studies have relied heavily 
on random sampling because of the vast amount of information 
contained in the land patents. However, these attempts have 
barely begun to tap the wealth contained in the Virginia land 
patents.
In order to correct this neglect and to determine land 
acquisition patterns in the colonial Chesapeake, a computer 
data base of the information contained in Nugent's abstracts 
was created covering all the patents from 1660-1706. This 
data base includes all names, dates, locations (county, river, 
creek, parish, etc.), and relationships (neighbor, previous 
owner, headright, etc.). A breakdown of how the land came 
into the ownership of the patentee (new land, lapsed land, 
escheated land, inherited land, land previously patented by 
another, patent renewal, etc.) allows more precise estimates 
of land acquisition.
The land patent system used throughout the colonial 
period was basically a continuation of the practices initiated 
under the Virginia Company. By the Second Charter (1609) , the 
Company was appointed and allowed "'under their common seal 
[to] distribute, convey, assign...such particular portions of 
lands...unto such our loving subjects" (Harrison 12). Actual 
distribution of land began after 1616. The headright was
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almost exclusively the grounds on which land patents were 
awarded during the seventeenth century. Although there were 
many variations (well described by Voorhis [19-21]), the basic 
headright guaranteed that a grant of fifty acres be made for 
every person immigrating to the colony, the grant being "'made 
respectively to such persons and their heirs at whose charges 
the said persons going to inhabit in Virginia shall be 
transported1" (Harrison 16-17). Although in temporary 
confusion with the demise of the Company in 1624, land policy 
continued essentially unchanged under the Crown until the 
introduction in 1699 of the treasury right, which allowed a 
person to acquire a patent by payment of a fixed fee. 
Basically anyone could take up a patent for new land at any 
time as long as there was no legal objection.
According to Beverley, a patent for new land was acquired
thus:
First, the Man proves his Rights; that is, he makes 
Oath in [County] Court, of the Importation of so 
many Persons, with a List of their Names. This List 
is then certified by the Clerk of that Court, to the 
Clerk of the Secretaries Office; who examines into 
the Validity of them, and files them in that Office, 
attesting them to be regular. When the Rights are 
thus certified, they are produced to the Surveyor 
of the County, and the Land is shewed to him; who 
thereupon is bound by his Oath to make the Survey,
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if the Land had been not Patented bef ore.... This 
Survey being made, a Copy thereof is carried with 
the Certificate of Rights to the Secretaries Office, 
and there (if there be no Objection) a Patent must 
of course be made out upon it, which is presented 
to the Governor and Council to pass. (277-8)
What we call today the "Virginia Land Patents" are 42 
volumes (in 10 books) of "recorded copies of patents for land 
issued by the English crown between 1623-1706 and 1710-1774," 
preserved in the Virginia State Library in Richmond (Gentry 
3) . The original patents were hung as loose leaves on strings 
in the 17 th century (Nugent 1:226, 394) but by 1683 the
process of transcription had begun (Nugent 1:152). The 
essential question for the historian is what percentage of the 
original patents were eventually recorded in the bound patent 
books? Contemporary sources offer a fairly gloomy picture. 
The earliest evidence comes in the October 1666 "Act for 
conformation of titles" passed by the Assembly. Finding "many 
pattents for great parcells of land, for which there appeare 
not any right upon record," the act traces the problem to the 
"defects of the clerks of those times in not makeing present 
entry of the rights delivered to them, and the casualty of two 
severall fires whereby many of those rights with other papers 
were destroyed" (Hening 2:245). Robert Beverley, who trans­
cribed Patent Books 2 & 3, describes the general shambles of 
the Secretaries Office in the years following Bacon's Rebel-
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lion, along with the devastation of the Jamestown fire of 
October 1698 (102-103). Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton noted
in 1697 that "there are many Patents and other Records, in 
that Office, in loose torn pieces, that are scarcely legible, 
and if some speedy Care not be taken, they will become of no 
Use" (49) . However, most modern historians from Bruce to 
Wertenbaker to Craven have placed much confidence in the 
preservation of the original record (Bruce 1:528-9; Werten­
baker 34; Craven 12,33).
One historian who has questioned the completeness of the 
land patent record is Edmund Morgan. In a comparative 
analysis of county records with land patents (as abstracted 
by Nugent), he found that "most of the patents that appear in 
[county] deeds appear also in the patent books, but a good 
number do not...And even in the patent books themselves there 
is evidence of omissions. It was common for a man who 
purchased land from another man to obtain a new patent in his 
own name, often with additional acreage granted for persons 
imported. The date of the first patent and the name of the 
person who obtained it were recited in the second. But the 
original record of the first patent is often not to be found 
in the patent books" (365).
Morgan's method for determining the completeness of the 
patent record from the patents themselves is certainly test­
able using the patent data base. A computer search for 
matched patents, by name (using a coding system to account
37
for variant spellings described in Appendix I) and exact date, 
yielded an overall correlation of 48.5% for the years 1664-
1706. However, a rigorous combined manual and computer search 
for the non-matched patents revealed a correlation of 86.2%. 
Sometimes the date was off by a day or a year, sometimes the 
name was spelled just enough different that the coding system 
failed to match, but the county, location, acreage were all 
identical. These problems are all due, no doubt, to the many 
times the names and dates have been transcribed from the 
original patent to the patent books to Nugent's abstracts. 
Undoubtedly, slight errors have been introduced with each 
transcription.
A breakdown of annual survivability correlations for the 
years 1660-1706 shows a wide range, indicating certain years 
suffered greater loss of records. In particular, the years 
1660-1662 show a very high loss because very few of the 
original patents can be traced in this time period. For the 
succeeding years 1663-1666, the correlation improves each year 
but are still well below the average. Undoubtedly these low 
correlations verify the problems identified in the October 
1666 "Act for conformation of titles" mentioned above. This 
is also confirmed by the great number of renewals of patents 
in the late 1660s for land originally patented during the 
early 1660s.
For the years 1667-1687 the record is remarkably complete 
with a correlation of 94.4%. Interestingly the correlation
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drops for the years 1688-1706 to 70.7%, possibly indicating 
problems pointed out by Beverley and Hartwell, Blair, and 
Chilton, but it also could be random error due to the exceed­
ingly small number of references to patents in this time 
period. I have no doubt the actual correlations would be much 
higher if I had the tools for taking into account every 
possible transcription error. From this analysis, I believe 
the patent record for the years 1664-1706 is complete enough 
to present no problem for the study of land acquisition 
patterns in late 17th century Virginia.
One inherent problem with the land patents for any study 
of the "colony" of Virginia are the land grants in the 
Northern Neck, the great peninsula between the Potomac River 
and Rappahannock River, whose history differed significantly 
from the rest of the colony. Originally granted in 1649 to 
"Lord Ralph Horton, Lord Henry Jermyn, Lord John Culpeper, 
Sir John Berkeley, Sir William Morton, Sir Dudley Wyatt, and 
Thomas Culpeper, Esq. by Charles, the exiled son of executed 
Charles I, for their support. Lord Thomas Culpeper, son of 
one of the original patentees, by 1681 had purchased the 
rights of the other patentees and become sole proprietor of 
the Northern Neck" (Gray ix). Actually land in the Northern 
Neck continued to show up in the Virginia land patents through 
1679 and proprietary land grants in the Northern Neck did not 
start until 1690. Only the first volume (1690-1692) of the 
Northern Neck land grants was transcribed by Nugent; Gertrude
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Gray completed transcriptions of the later Northern Neck land 
grants. The present data base does not include data from 
either of these abstracts.
The basic problem is whether to include grants in the 
Northern Neck in a study of land acquisition in colonial 
Virginia. The 1660s, when the Northern Neck was part of the 
colonial land patent system, was a period of rapid land 
acquisition in the Northern Neck. Undoubtedly, land available 
in the Northern Neck swayed decisions to claim land in the 
1660s. Similarly, the uncertainties of land title in the 
Northern Neck in the late 17th century undoubtedly swayed 
potential patentees to the south. The Northern Neck patent 
system for the period under study was in considerable flux; 
the office was closed during the years 1700-1703 (Gray 27) and 
probably at other times. The best alternative is to present 
three analyses: (1) all new land in the Virginia (Nugent)
patents "as is", including patents in the Northern Neck before 
1679; (2) only new land patents south of the Rappahannock
River; and (3) all new land in the Virginia (Nugent) patents 
and Northern Neck (Nugent and Gray) patents through 1706. 
Northern Neck patent analysis was restricted to simply 
tabulating annual totals of new land patent acreage from the 
Nugent and Gray Northern Neck abstracts. In the regular 
Virginia patents, there is generally little problem identify­
ing whether the patent is for land above or below the Rappa­
hannock since the county is usually listed as part of the
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patent. However, a problem does exist for Lancaster County 
through 1669 and "Old" Rappahannock County through 1692 since 
these counties covered land on both sides of the Rappahannock. 
Fortunately, enough information is usually contained in the 
patents to identify the patent as either north or south of the 
Rappahannock River. Table I presents the three different 
patent acreage series.
Land Acquisition vs Land Speculation and Engrossment
Why did people acquire land? Although the staples and 
Malthusian models explain the overall growth and development 
of early America, individuals made decisions to acquire land. 
As seen by McCusker and Menard, the Malthusian and staples 
approaches have individual counterparts called the "subsis­
tence model" and the "market model." The "subsistence model" 
claims that "farmers were not much concerned with profit, that 
their principal interests were subsistence and the long-term 
security of the farm, that they did not try to maximize 
production of cash crops and marketed only their surplus, that 
they avoided risk and were suspicious of innovations." In the 
"market model," "farmers were latent entrepeneurs, willing to 
take risks and accept innovation, who found their drive for 
profits frustrated by high factor prices, primitive techno­
logies, poor transportation networks, and weak markets" 
(McCusker 298) . These models hypothesize very different
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TABLE I
ANNUAL VIRGINIA NEW LAND PATENT ACREAGE
Year Virginia Rappahannock Virginia
Patent South Northern
Acres Patent Patent
Acres Acres
1664 146392 94640 146392
1665 93244 70156 93244
1666 135923 94160 135923
1667 105290 74891 105290
1668 64526 41683 64526
1669 82194 50943 82194
1670 82079 51051 82079
1671 48177 44695 48177
1672 91257 79543 91257
1673 106468 104455 106498
1674 104250 89160 104520
1675 34709 34013 34709
1676 28391 28391 28391
1677 24835 2048 24835
1678 49320 22733 49320
1679 23260 15860 23260
1680 33420 33420 33420
1681 38239 38239 38329
1682 69299 69299 69299
1683 54127 54127 54127
1684 40826 40826 40826
1685 28836 28836 28836
1686 36546 36546 36546
1687 55198 54773 55198
1688 28365 28365 28365
1689 18838 18838 18838
1690 60469 60469 63049
1691 39591 39591 51650
1692 17923 17923 28615
1693 22899 22899 22980
1694 24593 24593 46504
1695 25987 25987 46375
1696 25175 25175 34138
1697 7114 7114 13288
1698 11764 11764 14324
1699 36496 36496 39451
1700 18281 18281 19376
1701 65708 65708 65708
1702 46426 46426 46426
1703 49701 49701 49900
1704 24996 24996 51956
1705 45170 45170 52685
1706 16264 16264 27745
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reasons for why people migrated to new lands. 1 In the 
subsistence model, 'push' factors dominated migration deci­
sions: migrants moved away from overcrowded settlements with 
their poor prospects for economic independence rather than 
toward better market possibilities". In the market model, the 
'puli' of better prospects predominated: migrants moved toward 
chances for commercial agriculture rather than away from 
depressed conditions" (304-5).
But as McCusker and Menard note, "in practice, push and 
pull are of course difficult to separate— migration flows are 
best understood as responses to differences in anticipated 
income" (305). To determine "differences in anticipated 
income," "Malthusian" historians focus on differences in 
population density; "staples" historians focus on changes in 
the staples economy, particularly changes in staples prices.
In the final analysis, decisions to acquire new land can 
not be separated from decisions to migrate. Land speculators 
may have anticipated increased demand for land ahead of other 
planters, but the speculators' understanding of what created 
demand for land would not have been basically different from 
other planters. New land acquired value from individual men 
and women who voluntarily or involuntarily moved to the 
frontier to settle on the land. If men and women would not 
migrate then the land had no value, no matter how high tobacco 
prices rose. Migration and land acquisition could have been 
led by staples factors, Malthusian factors, or a combination
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of the two, but migration and land acquisition were intricate­
ly linked.
All Chesapeake historians from Bruce to Wertenbaker to 
the present have acknowledged widespread land speculation in 
the colonial era. However, most of these historians have 
traditionally believed that land speculation did not lead to 
land engrossment and did not adversely affect the growth and 
development of the colonial Chesapeake. Wertenbaker claims 
that, because "large planters found it difficult to secure 
adequate labor, of necessity they had to break up their 
estates and dispose of them to the small freeholders" (49) . 
The Browns find that "speculators sold their land, and because 
men could always patent land from the King, they had to sell 
at a price within the reach of the common man" (16). Clemens 
finds that "speculators had seldom withheld land from sale. 
Most acquired land in large blocks and sold it quickly; they 
profited not from artificially high prices but from the volume 
of their transactions" (75) . Earle believes that "a few 
patrician planters may have helped raise land prices through 
social hoarding of land for their progeny or for social 
status, but in general, planters regarded land as a commodity" 
(209).
On the other hand, some historians have implied that the 
colonial land patent system was an elite land acquisition 
system. In Clemens's analysis, only "nonresidents— specula­
tors, merchants, and provincial officeholders" took advantage
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of the patenting process (72). Morgan implies that land 
patents, land speculation, and land engrossment were all one 
in the same (1975,218-221).
Clemens and Morgan, however, ignore small resident 
planters who used the land patent process extensively. In my 
examination of the patents from 1660-1703, out of 4251 patents 
for new land (including patents which combined new land 
acquisition with other sources of land acquisition), I found 
a median "new" patent acreage of 3 00 acres and a mode of 2 00 
acres. A breakdown of cumulative new patent acreage by the 
2 7 58 patentees (using the namecoding system described in 
Appendix I) shows a median of 400 acres and a mode of 200 
acres. This median cumulative acreage is slightly less than 
the acreage identified by Kevin Kelly as the approximate "size 
of the average freehold in Surry during the late seventeenth 
century" (1979,190), indicating the average patentee was not 
that much different from the average landowner.
However, large speculators did patent much of the "new" 
land. For the years 1660-1703, the mean "new" patent acreage 
was 546 acres with a standard deviation of 921 acres, indicat­
ing the presence of some very large patentees. Patents ranged 
from the 34 perches (approximately 2/10 acre) patented by 
Thomas Wells in James City on 26 October 1699 (Nugent 3:32) 
to the 20,000 acres patented by Phillip Ludwell, Tobias 
Handford and Richard Whitehead in New Kent County on 24 
October 1673 (Nugent 2:130) . The top 10% of the "new" patents
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(1100+ acres) contained 45.0% of the land patented from 
1660-1703. A breakdown of cumulative acreage by patentee 
shows even greater disparity with a mean of 8 58 acres and 
standard deviation of 1580 acres and the top 10% of patentees 
(1860+ cumulative acres) patenting 50.3% of all new patent 
acreage. (All such estimates of cumulative acreage are 
undoubtedly exaggerated by combining different people with the 
same name, including father-and-son combinations. For example, 
Robert Beverley patented a maximum 18,800 "new" acres between 
1660 and 1703, but this was patented by both father and son.)
The patent system also provided a means for all land­
owners, large and small, to reaffirm their titles. Patents 
for "new" land composed only 53.3% of all patents and 55.1% 
of patent acreage between the years 1660 and 17 06. The rest 
of the patents are made up of patents for escheated land 
(6.7%), lapsed land (7.8%), dowry land (0.9%), deeded land 
(18.0%), patent renewal (9.0%), resurveyed land (0.6%), and 
inherited (or deed of gift) land (3.7%).
This analysis shows that the land patent process combined 
a great number of small patentees and a small number of great 
patentees. However, when any one person could only tend about 
four acres planted in tobacco a year (Morgan 370), and with 
an optimum acreage per person of 50 acres, even the smallest 
patentees appear to be indulging in land speculation and 
engrossment. Without additional information, this behavior 
can not be classified as either "subsistence" or "market," for
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the additional acreage could have been held for other crops, 
pasturage, forest products, field rotation, speculation, 
children's inheritance (Easterlin 63-70), or so farm hands 
could be kept busy clearing and improving new land during the 
off-season (Lebergott 186).
Most local studies have shown that speculation in 
patented lands dominated the land market in every newly 
settled region of the Chesapeake. Once settled, land sales 
became the dominant means of land transfer. Kelly found that 
"a majority of all grants were eventually sold, either intact 
or in parcels, and... the average interval between their 
patenting and sale was brief— nine years during the 1660s and 
1670s and only four years in the 1680s. This is even more 
true of the 54 percent that were subdivided rather than sold 
intact" (Kelly,1979,190). Clemens found in Talbot County that 
a "flurry of patenting activity soon led to extensive buying 
and selling of land" (72).
The Crown had a vested interest in preventing land 
engrossment. Engrossment would discourage immigration to the 
colony and encourage emigration from the colony, thus inhibit­
ing any increase in tobacco production upon which the Crown 
was heavily dependent for revenues. As Hartwell, Blair, and 
Chilton pointed out in 1699, "in actual revenues the esta­
blishment of one planter on every fifty acres would result in 
returns from tobacco duties 2 00 times as great as would be 
derived from the same area unoccupied, even if quit-rents
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should be fully collected" (Gray 1:400). One of the main 
purposes for the adoption of the headright as the basis for 
land acquisition was to intricately tie land to population to 
prevent engrossment. Other than the initial cost of land, 
engrossment should have been inhibited by two conditions which 
could lead to forfeiture of land tenure:
(a) failure to pay quit-rents of two shillings per 
hundred acres
(b) failure to inhabit and cultivate the land within 
three year ("lapsed land")
Ouit-Rents and Land Speculation
The role of quit-rents in land acquisition patterns is 
not clear. In the most thorough survey of the quit-rent 
system in early America, Beverley Bond called Virginia's 
quit-rent system "the earliest and most successful of the 
quit-rent systems under the crown" (221). The rate esta­
blished by the London Company of 2 shillings per 100 acres 
was retained through the entire colonial period. Through 
1684, as Bond states, "the quit-rents were reserved in 
Virginia as a customary charge upon the land, but the British 
government paid little attention to collection, and allowed 
these feudal dues to come under local control" (221). After 
1684, "the careful supervision of the auditor-general, William 
Blathwayt, assisted by the two governors, Nicholson and
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Spotswood, converted a system of quit-rents that had previous­
ly been administered in an exceedingly careless fashion into 
an important source of revenue" (Bond 2 24).
Bruce believes that although there was a laxness in 
paying quit-rents at different times in the 17th century, "the 
quitrents were collected with a strictness on the whole" 
(560) . "After the Restoration, Berkeley was instructed to 'no 
longer forbear,1 and thereafter progress was made toward 
getting a majority of the landowners on the rent-roll. This 
fee was not a great burden on land under cultivation, for 
payment was made in tobacco at a rate which often cut the tax 
in half...but altogether the main obstacle was the indif­
ference of the sheriffs in collecting the fee, together with 
the natural reluctance of the people to pay any sum however 
small. Occasional pressure of the governors upon the sheriffs 
gradually induced most plantation owners to pay at least the 
greater part of their dues, for the sheriff was empowered to 
seize goods if the quitrent was refused" (Voorhis 77).
What effect quit-rents had on land speculation and 
engrossment is uncertain. Apparently no land was ever seized 
for failure to pay quit-rents (Voorhis 77-78). Bond believes 
that, at least before 1684, the quit-rents had little effect 
on the holding of vast, undeveloped areas of land. "As there 
was no personal property upon these vacant lands, distraint, 
the usual means of forcing collections, was out of the 
question, and the only other possible measure, forfeiture of
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the land, could not be employed in face of the popular 
opposition it was certain to provoke" (Bond 228).
An analysis of quit-rent acreages and land patent acreage 
by county reveals that most patent acreage did not escape the 
quit-rent lists. For the period under study, annual county 
quit-rent totals exist for the years 1663-1665, 1688, and
1702-1704.1 Between 1665 and 1688, the increase in quit-rent 
acreage equaled 63.6% of the new patent acreage. Between 1663 
and 1704, the increase in quit-rent acreage equaled a full 
85.9% of the new patent acreage. These percentages do not 
represent a one-to-one correspondence between patent and 
quit-rent acreage because some pre-1663 patent acreage was 
undoubtedly added to the quit-rent list after 1663.
In order to get a better estimate of the percentage of 
patent lands which were recorded on the quit-rent lists, we 
need an estimate of total patent acreage. Since the data base 
does not extend before 1660 and since many patents are missing 
during the years 1659-1663, this might be difficult. However, 
a reasonable estimate might be obtained by assuming annual new 
acre patents for 1659-1663 was the same as 1664 (based on 
analysis of missing patents in these years) and by using 
Craven's headright totals (15) for the years 1634-1658 to 
determine earlier patent acreage.
1 For the years 1663-1665: Virginia Magazine of History 
and Biography 3:42-47; for the year 1688: Virginia Historical 
Register 3:181-188; for the years 1702-1704: C.O. 5/1313, ff. 
436-437; C.O. 5/1314, ff. 113-114, ff. 436-437.
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As Edmund Morgan notes, the headrights are highly 
correlated with new patent acreage (1973,369-370). Indeed, 
the annual new patent acreage to headright ratio is usually 
in the 45-50 range, as might be expected with the 50 acre per 
headright allowance. The actual ratio is somewhat less than 
50 because headrights are also required for lapsed land 
patents and some patents do not claim all of the 50 acres due 
for each headright. For the years 1660-1669 the average ratio 
was 47.1, but ranged from 58.1 in 1660 to 38.6 in 1668. Using 
this 47.1 ratio and Craven's totals for the years 1634-1658 
and patent estimates for the years 1659-1662, 1663 quit-rent
acreage was found to be 46.3% of total cumulative acreage from 
1634-1662. Extending this technique for the patents 1663-1703, 
17 04 quit-rent acreage was found to be 67.3% of total cumula­
tive acreage from 1634-1703.
There were vast differences between individual counties 
in the patent acreage change to rent roll acreage change 
comparison for the period 1663-1704. Of the counties with 
relatively large patent acreage, most of the counties were in 
the 80-90% range, but Accomack (98.2%) and Surry (96.4%) 
contrasted with Nansemond (59.8%). Of the counties with 
relatively small patent acreage, Warwick (118.4%) contrasted 
with York (18.1%).
Overall, it does not appear that patentees were avoiding 
payment of quit-rents. This analysis does reveal a strong 
improvement in quit-rent enforcement in the period 1688-1702
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when more acres (155.0%) were added to the quit-rent lists 
than were actually patented, which supports the beliefs of 
both Bond and Bruce that the system was improving. Interest­
ingly, the system had improved sometime before 17 02, at least 
two years before the celebrated 1704 "full" quit-rent list.
Michael Nicholls notes that, in the Southside, some land 
owners may have avoided quit-rents by holding land by survey 
without completing the land patent process (75). What little 
evidence I have uncovered tends to show this was not so for 
the colony as a whole. Lists of patents for lands for April 
1706 and October 1706 found in Colonial Office records (C.O. 
5/1315, ff. 134-136, 169-172) which lists dates of surveys
indicate (out of 94 surveys) a mean gap of 11.4 months between 
survey and patent and a median gap of 8 months. This shorter 
time lag is much more in agreement with the statutory require­
ment that the plat be "returned to the capitol within six 
months of completion and a patent issued on the survey within 
six more months" (Nicholls 74).
Land Acquisition and Lapsed Land
Lapsed land played a significant role in early Virginia 
land acquisition, and became increasingly more significant 
with time. "The law allowed anyone to take up such land by 
proving to the governor and council that the claim was 
deserted" (Voorhis 74). For the time period 1660-1706, 619
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patents (7.8% of all patents) for 421,000 acres (10.1% of all 
patent acreage) were for lapsed land. Comprising less than 
5% of total land patents in the 1660s, patents for lapsed land 
rose to over 20% of total land patents in the 1690s. Between 
1664 and 17 06, while annual new patent acreage was decreasing 
at 1800 acres per year, lapsed land acreage was increasing at 
2 00 acres per year.
This increasingly high percentage of lapsed land has been 
curiously ignored by historians. Historians have commented 
on the laxness with which the rules of seating were enforced 
and the general acceptance of that laxness (Bruce 555-556). 
Voorhis concludes that "throughout the seventeenth century the 
requirement that land be occupied and cultivated was practi­
cally a dead letter. If one absolutely ignored his land and 
neglected to protect his title when it was brought into ques­
tion, then, indeed, he ran the risk of losing his property 
...Search of the patent records has failed to reveal an 
instance of the forfeit and regrant of land for want of culti­
vation, in a case where the owner defended his rights" (74).
This laxness is confirmed by my analysis of the land pat­
ents. Large multi-tract, multi-county landowners lost 
relatively little of their land to lapsing, although most such 
great planters did lose some land due to lapsing. The average 
owner of lapsed land was a small landowner who had patented 
only one or two relatively small tracts, and who patented no 
other land after the date of lapsing. On the average,
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patentees were allowed far more than the maximum three years 
to "seat" their plantation and the amount of time allowed 
actually increased over the 17th century. By 17 00, the 
average time between original patent date and subsequent 
lapsed patent date was well over fifteen years.
The increase in lapsed land claims could reflect an 
increase in demand for lapsed land over new land. Lapsed land 
was undoubtedly more economically attractive than new land 
because it would have the benefits of all earlier patented 
lands, such as closer proximity to navigable waters. The 
patentee of lapsed land saved on surveying fees, but was 
required to go through the trouble of petitioning the General 
Court for the land.
However, more likely the colony-wide increase in lapsed 
land simply reflects the aging of the Virginia colony and the 
shortage of new land in the older parts of the colony. The 
colony-wide rise in lapsed land claims was mirrored in most 
counties. In each county, usually a few years after the end 
of a phase of rapid land acquisition, there would follow a 
phase of lapsed land acquisition. As Nicholls notes for the 
Southside (79), whether for social or economic reasons, new 
land was preferred over lapsed land as long as new land was 
available in the county. When new land was no longer avail­
able, demands for lapsed land increased.
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Comparative Analysis of Land Patents and 17 04 Quit-Rent List:
Both Wertenbaker and Voorhis have examined the rela­
tionship of land speculation to land engrossment using the 
land patents and the 1704 quit-rent list. The 1704 quit-rent 
list includes, by county, the name of each land owner and his 
owned acreage in 17 04.2
Viewing the quit-rent list, Wertenbaker was "struck by 
the number of little holdings, the complete absence of huge 
estates, the comparative scarcity even of those that for a 
newly settled country might be termed extensive" (53). 
Voorhis's calculations showed "some suggestion of the sub­
division of larger grants by sale of land to freed servants 
and others, and by allotment among the children of deceased 
patent holders" (70). Indeed, the quit-rent list reveals a 
much more egalitarian society than the patent analysis. 
Breaking down individual landholdings by county (combining 
all tracts patented by or owned by the same individual in any 
one county but ignoring multi-county land holdings), the mean 
cumulative "new" acreage patented (1660-17 03) was 683 acres 
(std. dev. 1200 acres) while the mean 1704 rent roll acreage
For this analysis, I relied heavily on a computer data 
base of the 1704 quit-rent list developed as part of the York 
County Project of the Department of Historical Research at the 
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation funded in part by National 
Endowment for the Humanities grant #RS-00033-80-1604. I am 
extremely grateful to Dr. Cary Carson and Ms. Linda Rowe for 
their help in obtaining access to this data base.
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was 450 acres (std. dev. 782 acres). The median acreage was 
344 patented acres versus 22 5 rent roll acres. The top 10% 
of patentees patented 48.2% of patented land acreage, but the 
top 10% of 1704 landholders only owned 44.7% of 1704 rent roll 
land acreage.
In a comparative analysis of individuals (using the name- 
coding system described in Appendix I) in both the patents and 
1704 quit-rent list, as shown in Table II, only 20.7% of 1704 
land owners had already patented land. Those land owners who 
used the patent process owned on average 3 50 more acres than 
those land owners who did not. Of those who had patented 
land, the mean year of first patent was 1683 and, interesting­
ly, for the colony as a whole the average patentee on the 1704 
quit-rent list had patented a mean 110 acres (median 57 acres) 
less than he owned in 1704.
There were wide differences between individual counties; 
for most counties, rent roll acreages actually exceeded patent 
acreages, indicating patentees were acquiring land by means 
other than patenting. New Kent, Northampton, Nansemond, and 
Isle of Wight counties undoubtedly had considerable land 
specualtion. However, these calculations most likely under­
estimate the difference of quit-rent acreage over patented 
acreage, especially due to the undercounting of quit-rent 
acreage (for example, in Nansemond County where undercounting 
was marked). The presence of several generations with the 
same given name (for example, the several Edmund Scarburghs
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TABLE II
CUMULATIVE PATENT AND 17 04 QUIT-RENT ACREAGE 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Percent Mean Mean Mean Mean
County Patentees Year Matched Matched Non-Matched
Among First Patent Quit-Rent Quit-Rent
Landowners Patent Acreage Acreage Acreage
Charles City 21.1 1686 741.1 792 .7 375.6
Essex 19 .1 1677 529 . 6 571. 9 375 . 8
Elizabeth City 8 . 7 1694 176. 7 492 . 5 237.5
Gloucester 19 . 7 1678 374 . 1 684 . 6 364 . 3
Henrico 34 . 7 1686 985 . 0 1305.2 343 . 6
Isle of Wight 24 . 8 1682 737 . 0 688 . 2 518 . 7
James City 7 . 2 1681 244 . 7 1217.2 333 . 5
Lower Norfolk 33 . 0 1682 507 . 5 679 . 0 334 . 0
Middlesex 20 . 5 1691 174 . 7 807 . 0 303 . 4
Nansemond 35 . 4 1686 479 . 5 430. 6 281. 7
New Kent 17 . 9 1686 1051.9 479 . 5 430.6
Northampton 15. 2 1674 1330.9 1141.7 432 . 5
Surry 19 . 1 1684 509 . 9 981. 9 358 . 5
Warwick 12 . 6 1685 203 . 9 489 . 3 293 . 6
York 9 . 1 1684 259 . 0 678 . 1 276.5
All 20.7 1683 686. 6 797 . 0 359. 7
Note: Several counties were combined for this analysis:
Accomack and Northampton; New Kent, King & Queen, King 
William? Lower Norfolk, Norfolk, and Princess Anne; 
Charles City and Prince George.
Source: See text.
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on the Eastern Shore), also complicates the analysis in
reflecting more family than individual landholdings and
exaggerating the mean year of first patent and cumulative 
patented acreage.
This analysis shows that the average patentee did not
speculate in land, but simply continued to accumulate lands
by other means.3 However, these averages disguise signi­
ficant differences. Of the 1051 patentees who appear on the 
1704 quit-rent list, 56.8% were accumulators, 38.9% specula­
tors, and 4.3% held the same amount of land they had patent­
ed. Accumulators patented on average 441 acres (median 226 
acres) but owned on average 1077 acres (median 650 acres). 
Speculators patented on average 1090 acres (median 600 acres) 
but owned on average 630 acres (median 260 acres). Those who 
owned the same as patented, the modal patentee, patented and 
owned on average 287 acres (median 200 acres). Tables III and 
IV show that large patentees were also large speculators and 
large land owners were also large land accumulators; likewise 
small patentees tended to be accumulators and small owners 
tended to be speculators.4 A large land accumulator like
3 This level of analysis can not determine whether the 
the land owned in 1704 is identical to the land previously 
patented. Perhaps landowners sold the land they patented and 
purchased the land they owned. More local work will be 
required to determine the prevalency of such a practice.
4 A multiple regression analysis yields the results:
ACREDIFF= 2164* -321*ACRES -5.2 DATEDIFF -94.3 FRON + e 
(11.4) (9.4) (1.7) (0.8)
R = 0.106
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William Randolph and a large land speculator like Edmund 
Scarburgh, although demonstrating radically different land 
acquisition behavior, undoubtedly had much more in common with 
each other than with small accumulators and speculators. But, 
apart from William Byrd, father and son (who both patented and 
owned great tracts of land in Henrico County), the stereo­
typical patentee as land engrosser/speculator did not exist.
and
ACREDIFF= -2128* + 490*RRACRES -16. 6*DATEDIFF -474.9*FRON + e 
(9.1) (13.9) (5.8) (4.7)
R — 0.18 3 
where
RRACRES = 1704 county quit-rent roll acreage 
ACRES = cumulative county new patent acreage 
ACREDIFF = RRACRES - ACRES
DATEDIFF = 1704 - year of first new patent
FRON = dummy variable to measure the effect of the frontier 
where FRON=0 for the land-locked counties of Elizabeth 
City, James City, Warwick, Gloucester, Middlesex, and 
York; for all other counties, FRON=l
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses. For 
additional information on the use of statistics, refer to 
Appendix II.
This regression confirms the results of Tables III and IV but 
also indicates that rent roll acreage tends to be a much 
better predictor of land acquisition behavior than patent 
acreage. The analysis also shows that older patentees and 
frontier patentees are more likely to be speculators than 
accumulators. Inclusion of dummy variables to test the effect 
of regional differences other frontier effects showed no 
significant coefficients.
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF NEW LAND PATENTEES APPEARING ON 17 04 QUIT-RENT 
LIST BY CUMULATIVE COUNTY PATENT ACREAGE GROUPINGS
Cumulative
Patent
Acreage
N Percent
Specu­
lators
Mean
Year
First
Patent
Mean
Quit-Rent
Acreage
Mean
Acreage
Difference
0-100 178 3 .9 1687 522 . 4 457 . 7
101-200 169 20.1 1686 474 . 2 318 . 9
201-300 130 31.5 1686 530. 5 269 . 5
301-400 118 40.7 1683 642 . 0 280.9
401-600 141 54 . 6 1684 661. 9 153 . 1
601-800 93 63 . 4 1680 628 .4 -69 . 2
801-1000 59 47 . 5 1679 1272 . 9 353 . 0
1001-1500 63 69 . 8 1679 921. 8 -332 . 0
1501-2000 37 73 . 0 1673 1630.7 -119.7
2001-3000 28 57 . 1 1676 2030.0 -338 . 6
3001-5000 18 72 . 2 1678 2600.0 -1120.8
5001-10000 15 93 . 3 1671 3292.1 -3427 . 6
10000+ 2 50.0 1669 10750.0 -8552.0
All 1051 38.9 1683 797.0 110.4
Mean acreage difference equals 1704 quit-rent acreage minus 
cumulative county patent acreage. Negative numbers, where 
patented acreage exceeds owned acreage, is considered evidence 
of land speculation for the purposes of calculating percent 
speculators in each group.
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TABLE IV
ANALYSIS OF 
LIST
NEW LAND PATENTEES APPEARING ON 17 04 QUIT-RENT 
BY COUNTY QUIT-RENT ACREAGE GROUPINGS
Mean
Acreage
Difference
-216.2 
-268.7 
- 111.3 
-167.7 
-49 . 3 
154 . 8 
116. 3 
478. 1 
409 . 1 
1066.2 
1289.7 
4254.1 
6908.5
110.4
Quit-Rent
Acreage
N Percent
Specu-^
lators*
Mean
Year
First
Patent
Mean
Quit-Rer
Acreage
0-100 100 68 . 0 1684 302 . 4
101-200 182 62 . 6 1684 441.2
201-300 137 42 . 3 1684 379 . 6
301-400 116 52 . 6 1681 535. 3
401-600 140 30 . 0 1685 569 . 4
601-800 86 22 . 1 1683 560 . 5
801-1000 77 18 . 2 1683 812 . 3
_1001-1500 90 17 . 8 1684 784 . 0
1501-2000 45 15.6 1681 1375.9
2001-3000 37 10.8 1679 1521.0
3002-5000 27 18 . 5 1679 2436.8
5001-10000 10 10 . 0 1682 2393 . 4
10000+ 4 0 . 0 1669 7013.8
All 1051 38 . 9 1683 686. 6
Mean acreage difference equals 1704 quit-rent acreage minus 
cumulative county patent acreage. Negative numbers, where 
patented acreage exceeds owned acreage, is considered evidence 
of land speculation for the purposes of calculating percent 
speculators in each group.
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The patent system, although widely used for speculative 
purposes by large patentees, was on average a tool of neither 
land speculation nor land engrossment, but simply one of many 
means available for individual acquisition of land.
If the average patentee bought rather than sold land, 
then how did the other 8 0% of land owners come to acquire 
their land? Just as it is critical to note that most land 
owners in 17 04 did not use the patent system, it is also 
critical to note that most previous patentees did not own land 
in 1704. Only 36% of the individuals who patented land 
between 1660 and 1703 appear on the 1704 quit-rent list. (The 
average patentee who did not show up on the 17 04 quit-rent 
list had patented 655 acres compared to the 687 acres of the 
patentee who did show up on the list, so the two types of 
patentees were not that different.) Undoubtedly, most of the 
land patented since the days of the London Company had left 
the hands of the original patentee and been acquired by others 
through the many alternative ways of acquiring land.5
Did the land patent system as a whole result in engross­
ment of land? Many local studies have shown that a large 
minority (or even a slight majority) of the inhabitants of 
the colonial Chesapeake owned no land (Nicholls 66; Walsh, 
1977,399; Earle, 1975,209; Kelly,1972,125 ; Morgan,1975,
Some of the patentees who did not show up on the 17 04 
rent roll might have been non-resident land speculators. If 
so, then this study shows that such speculation did not lead 
to land engrossment and the lands were dispersed in due time.
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221-222). The picture of landlessness might actually be much 
bleaker. In comparing individuals named in patent headrights 
and land owners on the 17 04 quit-rent list, Wertenbaker showed 
that "not more than five or six per cent of the indentured 
servants of [the Restoration] period succeeded in establishing 
themselves as planters" (97-98). In an independent analysis 
of the headrights and landowners (not just patentees but all 
indications of landholding) in the patent records, I found 
that 3.4% (N=10429) of the male headrights during the period
1660-1679 eventually became landowners, taking a mean 19 years 
to do so. For the period 1680-1699, only 0.6% (N=2934) of the 
headrights became land owners.6 Why the great masses of 
headrights never show up in later records is not certain. 
Most likely many died during seasoning, emigrated, squatted 
on frontier land, or simply avoided county officials.
However, since land continued to be patented, bought, 
and sold in every county of the Virginia colony, and since 
there was much land left to be patented on the frontier and 
even in the older counties, as shown in Table V, it is 
difficult to prove that there was land engrossment. "New" 
land continued to be patented in substantial quantities in
These patent results can only be treated as low 
estimates since the patent records are not the best indicators 
of land ownership. For these estimates, only landowners who 
first appeared as headrights in the patent records were 
considered. For most headright-landowner matches, the person 
actually appears as a landowner before he appears as a 
headright.
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TABLE V
COMPARISON OF 17 04 QUIT-RENT ACREAGE 
AND MODERN LAND ACREAGE
County Percent Acreage
Modern Patented
Acreage 1676-1703
Accomack 67 . 7 25,582
Charles City 44 . 2 47,529
Elizabeth City 81. 0 3 , 474
Essex 87 . 9 54,504
Gloucester 74 . 0 29,055
Henrico 94 . 5 99,623
Isle of Wight 67 . 4 51,928
James City 113 . 7 9, 058
King & Queen 77 . 9 100,641
King William 56 . 7 36,652
Middlesex 58 . 7 12,600
New Kent 128 . 1 110,3 3 3^
Norfolk 45 . 1 66,280*
Northampton 69 . 9 7,735
Nansemond 50. 7 77,257
Prince George 61. 9 72,336^
Princess Anne 57 . 3 53,788*
Surry 62 . 6 45,023
Warwick 78 . 4 5, 887
York 76.9 7 ,300
Lands of Lower Norfolk County (1676-1690) divided
equally between Norfolk County and Princess Anne 
County due to difficulty of separation.
Source: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, 
University of Virginia, Statistical Abstract of 
Virginia: 1966. Charlottesville, Va., 1967.
Patent Data Base
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every county from the time of Bacon's rebellion in 167 6 
through the 1704 quit-rent list. Even if this land was 
considered marginal in 1676, the land was available in 1676 
and it did not take long for the land to be reevaluated 
favorably. Although many of the percentages of modern acreage 
in Table III might be attributed to changes in definition of 
county boundaries, quit-rent abuse, or 17th century undersur­
veying errors (although oversurveying was probably just as 
much a problem) , the general availability of land is confirmed 
by local studies. Lorena Walsh found that even with "the rise 
in land prices, and a concomitant increase in tenancy at the 
turn of the century...in 1705 only about sixty percent of the 
land in [Charles County] had been surveyed, much less settled" 
(1977,402-405).
But does the high level of landlessness indicate engross­
ment? The problem is how to define engrossment. If engross­
ment means that not everyone can own the "best" lands, to that 
extent there is always engrossment. If engrossment means that 
those who desire land can only obtain economically marginal 
land and are forced to migrate in order to obtain "good" 
lands, then land was probably engrossed in the colonial 
Chesapeake. If land engrossment means that landowners own more 
land than they or their family can possibly farm by them­
selves, then most landowners in the colonial Chesapeake 
engrossed land.
But if engrossment means that individuals who desired
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land were thwarted at every turn by other individuals who 
monopolized all of the land or means of acquiring land, then 
the colonial Chesapeake was definitely not a region of land 
engrossment. Indeed, as long as land was available on the 
frontier and in marginally profitable areas for a fixed small 
price, land prices amd rents could not become exorbitant and 
a family farm was within the reach of the vast majority of 
white southerners. For those who could not afford the minimum 
capital cost of farm ownership, there was always tenancy.
And tenancy was, indeed, quite common throughout the 
early period of American history. Walsh believes "the 
explanation for a substantial rate of tenancy existing in an 
area where there was still land available virtually for the 
taking appears to lie in a complex inter-relationship between, 
among other things, soil quality, concentration of productive 
land, credit availability, and changing functions of tenancy 
itself" (1977,402-405). In a most thorough study of antebel­
lum tenancy in Georgia, Bode and Ginter conclude that "tenancy 
makes land available, particularly to those those, such as 
younger sons who have not the capital to purchase" (6). Many 
studies of the early American North have shown that tenancy 
was a normal part of the "agricultural ladder" and life-cycle 
age stratification (Henretta 7-8). In the antebellum North, 
renting a farm was "an important step toward ownership" 
(Danhof 88). Tenancy was mostly a function of wealth; to move 
into land holding status required some threshold amount of
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capital for investment which tenants lacked (Atack 24).
Freedmen who desired land, but for whom tenancy was beyond 
their economic means, could simply have squatted on unclaimed 
land. The abundance of land and the difficulty of policing the 
frontier undoubtedly allowed many landless to scratch out a 
living through squatting. That there are few mentions of 
squatting in the literature of the colonial Chesapeake might 
indicate that land was made legally available to the landless 
at terms they considered reasonable.
This is not to say that freedmen were unconstrained in 
their choice of tenancy, for constraints did exist. But to 
the degree that freedmen had a choice between land ownership, 
tenancy, and squatting, land was not engrossed. Each freedman 
simply pursued his self-interest in a social system which had 
never been and never would be egalitarian. Perhaps the issue 
of engrossment should be viewed from the perspective of the 
English laborer who had never owned and would never own land 
of his own. Although most Englishmen ideally would have 
preferred to own land free and clear, each freedman realisti­
cally weighed the advantages and disadvantages of leasing good 
land or migrating to good land versus patenting accessible poor 
land, including capital requirements, annual expenses, expected 
revenues, and risk factors.
That the freedman chose to be a tenant reflects, not 
engrossment, but simply the same self-interest which motivated 
people to emigrate to the New World and settle the frontier
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in the first place. "Perhaps when a poor man considered the 
various ways by which he might make a living in the county, 
survey or purchase of a marginal freehold may not have 
appeared to him to be the best alternative. Leasing more 
productive land— even though this entailed the payment of sub­
stantial rents— may have produced higher or at least equal net 
incomes" (Walsh,1977,414) . Likewise Carr and Menard, who 
found evidence of heavy migration from the Chesapeake at the 
end of the 17th century, believe that these freedmen emigrated 
"less out of a sense of despair than because they thought they 
could do better in the more recently settled and more rapidly 
growing American colonies" (1979,236237).
Although there is little evidence to show that the checks 
meant to prevent engrossment— quit-rents and lapsing— were 
effective, an analysis of these checks indicates they were at 
least in force during the second half of the 17th century and 
were much more likely to be effective than engrossment 
proponents would have us believe. Overall, there appears 
little evidence to show that potential land owners were 
prohibited from obtaining land, unless they were unwilling or 
unable to move to or patent the available land. What we might 
call land speculation or land engrossment, and indeed land 
acquisition, may be better lumped together "as a form of 
investment, promoted by colonial governments to provoke the 
opening and settlement of western lands and the concomitant 
economic development" (McCusker 334n). Overall we might
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summarize, as Lewis C. Gray did for all the southern colonies, 
that "the various land policies did not seriously restrict the 
supply of land, although in time inertia of population and the 
tendency toward engrossment caused the better lands in older 
settled districts to appear scarce" (1:403).
Timing of Land Acquisition
Clemens's study of land acquisition on Maryland's Eastern 
Shore has some significant and testable specifications for the 
timing of land acquisition in the colonial Chesapeake:
Chesapeake settlers had three principal options when 
they invested in the agricultural economy: patenting 
land, buying land, and purchasing labor. Because 
tobacco cultivation required little land in a given 
year, planters benefited when they responded to 
higher staples prices by purchasing a servant’s 
contract rather than more farming acreage. On the 
other hand, patenting land, once a person had been 
transported to the Chesapeake, cost little addition­
al tobacco...People consequently patented land when 
tobacco prices were high and servants were being 
brought to the Chesapeake" (72).
Interestingly, with such timing, land acquisition might 
be classified as more Malthusian than staples. Whether land 
is being acquired by great planters in order to put additional
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servants on satellite plantations or by small planters who are 
moving to the frontier with their servants, both were acquir­
ing land because of increased tithable population pressure on 
existing resources. Changes in land acqusition are only 
secondarily related to changes in tobacco prices. The primary 
cause of land acquisition is an increase in tithable popula­
tion density. In this case, tithable population density is 
related to tobacco prices and so the staples model explains 
the general dynamics of land acquisition. But if tithable 
population density was found to vary as a function of factors 
independent of tobacco prices--if immigration was more a 
function of English wage conditions than tobacco prices or if 
tithable population increase was due more to natural increase 
of a creole labor force than immigration--then the staples 
model may not be as useable. Thus, for studies of land 
acquisition, the staples model may only be a subset of the 
more general Malthusian model.
However, there are problems with Clemens's timing 
argument. Clemens makes a claim for a capital-short society 
where planters could make only one decision at a time: acquire 
servants or acquire land. If, as Clemens states, "patenting 
land, once a person had been transported to the Chesapeake, 
cost little additional tobacco," why did the small planters 
who imported the servants not acquire land at the same time 
(72)? And why, if headrights are such a marketable commodity, 
is patenting land so dependent on importing servants in
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Clemens's analysis (Clemens 71-72)? Most Chesapeake his­
torians, since Edmund Morgan's criticisms, have been wary to 
equate headrights with immigration. What Clemens finds may 
have been true of Maryland's Eastern Shore, but certainly his 
analysis of land acquisition has not been proven for the 
entire Chesapeake.
Nevertheless, Clemens does identify the utmost necessity 
of determining timing of land acquisition with respect to 
changes in both tobacco prices and population density if we 
are to properly test the two theories. Central to any such 
analysis, especially considering the intricate bureaucratic 
procedure involved in patenting land, must be an independent 
assessment of how long the land patent process took. What was 
the time lag from the start to the finish of the land patent 
process?
As Gavin Wright shows, the effect of changes in the price 
of the staple may not have an instantaneous effect on demand 
for land. Indeed, Wright found that "a distributed lag 
function, with the weights assigned to past cotton prices 
declining geometrically with time" gave the best results 
(112,116). Land acquisition may be lagged due to the time 
taken to make a decision to acquire new land, to the time 
necessary to accumulate the required capital from the windfall 
of rising tobacco prices, to the physical time required to 
fulfill the various requirements of the patenting process. 
In colonial Virginia, the slowness of the colonial bureau­
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cracy, the inefficiency of the Secretaries' Office, the 
shortage of surveyors, the difficulty of travel to Jamestown 
or Williamsburg, all may have effectively delayed the land 
patent process.
The only date reported on the land patents themselves is 
the date that the patent was finally issued, the finish date 
of the land patent process. In order to determine the start 
date, we need to examine independent sources. Referring back 
to Beverley's description of the land patent process, indepen­
dent dates for headright certificates and surveys, available 
from both county records and other colonial records, might 
help establish a start date.
Edmund Morgan, using the excellent index to Nugent's 
Cavaliers and Pioneers, analyzed the time lag between head- 
right certificate and land patent for several counties between 
the years 1645-1662. "With the aid of this index it is 
possible to trace the names from many county certificates to 
the land patent in which they were used. Where a certificate 
contains only one name, it is usually impossible to be sure 
that the same name in a patent is actually the same person. 
But where several names are on a certificate, as was usually 
the case, the same combination repeated in a patent makes the 
identification more certain" (1973,362-363). From this 
analysis, Morgan identified an average "gap between date of 
certificate and date of patent" of 20.4 months (as I calcu­
late) (1973,363).
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A comparable study was done for the years 1663-1706 using 
Stratton Nottingham's abstracts of headright certificates of 
Accomack County. The "gap" was tallied, not by number of 
headrights as Morgan did, but by number of certificates in 
order to determine the average patent time lag. Slightly less 
than half (44.0%) of the Accomack headright certificates were 
used by the person who initially obtained them with a median 
time lag of 7 months and a mean time lag of 13.4 months. A 
quarter (24.1%) of the headright certificates were used by 
persons other than the person who initially obtained them with 
a median time lag of 9 months and mean time lag of 26.0 
months. A third (31.9%) of the headright certificates could 
not be traced to any land patent. Almost all of the Accomack 
County headrights which appeared did so in Accomack or 
Northampton County patents, indicating very few of the 
certificates were sold outside of the Eastern Shore. Most of 
the headright certificates were recorded in the years before 
1675, but the time lag showed no discernible time trend over 
the entire time period 1663-1706.
Another estimate of the time lag between headright certi­
fication and patent was obtained by comparing a time series 
of county headright certification totals for the counties of 
Accomack (1664-1706), Lancaster (1664-1680), Northumberland 
(1678-1706), and York (1664-1706) with the Virginia land 
patent acreage series listed in Table I. In a multiple 
regression analysis with various time lags, as shown in Table
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VI, the best estimate was obtained with a 0-1 year time lag, 
indicating that demand for headrights preceded the acquisition 
of land by at most one year. It is possible that demand for 
or supply of headrights lagged behind demand for land, but 
this analysis would tend to support low estimates of time lag 
between demand for land and acquistion of land.
The analysis reported in the section on land speculation 
showed that the time lag between survey and patent was a mean
11.4 months and median 8 months, which tends to agree with a 
two year time lag for the patent process. An example is Col. 
Tully Robinson and Jonathan West of Accomack County who 
patented 500 acres on 1 May 1706 (Nugent 3:105) based on a 
survey by Edmund Scarburgh for Tully Robinson of 2 8 September 
1705 (C.O. 5/1315, 136) with 10 headrights combined from
certificates' of Mr. John Wise [West?], Sr. of 1 February 
1703/4 and Capt. Tully Robinson of 3 February 1703/4 (Nott­
ingham 62-63), a total process of 27 months.
Morgan was more concerned to show that the date of land 
patent was not the date of immigration than to determine the 
time required to patent land. However, the regularity of the 
one to two year time lag between headright certificate and 
land patent indicates that this is a reasonable estimate of 
the time necessary to patent land.
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TABLE VI 
HEADRIGHT-PATENT LAG ANALYSIS
Lag Constant HEAD YEAR D.W. R2
(Years)
0 1729000* 79 . 50* -1003* 1. 53* 0. 656
(3.4) (4.8) (3.3)
★ ★ ★
1 2212000 47 . 69 -1287 1. 63 0. 526
(3.7) (2.4) (3.6)
2 1896000* 44.01* -1100* 1.43* 0. 492
(3.2) (2.4) (3.1)
3 2079000* 28 . 58 -1208*
*
1. 20 0 .420
(3.2) (1.4) (3.1)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level Of
significance
Source: For headright certificates:
Accomack County (Nottingham, 1-64)
York County (Colonial Williamsburg abstracts) 
Northumberland County (Virginia Colonial 
Abstracts, County Order Books #4 & #5) 
Lancaster County (Virginia Colonial Abstracts, 
County Order Books #3, #3A & #4)
Note: For discussion of multiple regression analysis, see 
Appendix II.
ACRES = aO + al*HEAD-L + a2*YEAR + u
where
ACRES = Virginia new land patent acreage 
HEAD-L = annual headrights registered at county courts 
lagged by L years 
YEAR = patent year with 1664 as year 1
CHAPTER III
MALTHUSIAN FACTORS
Both the Malthusian and staples approaches tend to push 
aside other factors which might enter the land acquisition 
process. One such factor is the general loss of soil ferti­
lity over time. There is very little consensus on the role 
of soil depletion and erosion in migration and land acquisi­
tion decisions. Avery 0. Craven, who was very Malthusian in 
his emphasis on "push" factors, believed that soil depletion 
was the major factor in the westward migration. Lewis C. 
Gray, an economic historian, noted that "the expansion of 
cotton and tobacco left an ever widening circle of lands 
suffering from soil exhaustion" (1:910). Peter Passell, a 
new economic historian of the "staples" school focusing mostly 
on soil depletion in the antebellum South, states that 
"tobacco grown along the Atlantic Coastal Plain caused 
chemical imbalance which, left uncorrected, significantly 
reduced crop yields" (933). However, Passell recognizes that, 
unlike the upland South and the Cotton Belt, "the Coastal 
Plain rimming the South from Virginia to Texas is virtually 
free of erosion damage... since these land[s] are quite flat" 
(935).
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Most early American historians tend to downplay the 
importance of soil depletion and erosion. Carville Earle, 
following a staples approach, agrees with Craven and Passell 
that tobacco depleted the soil, "after ,which planters aban­
doned the field to nature and cleared a new parcel of land"
(25) . However, Earle believes "the abandonment was temporary 
while the 'old field1 rested and recovered its fertility, a 
period of about twenty years. Through this cyclical shifting 
of fields, planters maintained tobacco yields" (25). Darrett 
Rutman, following a Malthusian approach, finds that "the 
demographic process men and women were caught up in seems more 
determinative than the soil on which they lived." He found 
"optimum density" independent of both soil type and topography 
(1975,284).
If planters combatted soil depletion by holding extra 
lands as Earle suggests, a higher "optimum density" would be 
established than without soil depletion. This "optimum
density" would be a function of the particular staple since 
each staple depletes the soil differently. According to
Earle, tobacco required at least 20 arable acres per laborer 
(29), although he also states that by the time of the Ameri­
can Revolution, 50 acres per laborer may have been considered 
the norm. Both Earle and Kulikoff quote the anonymous author 
of American Husbandry, who in 1775 wrote "'a planter should 
have 50 acres of land for every working hand; with less than 
this they will find themselves distressed for want of room1"
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(Kulikoff,1986,48; Earle 210) . Kulikoff believes that, beyond 
the 2 0 acres for tobacco production, planters required an 
additional 30 acres per laborer "to grow corn, pasture to 
graze livestock, and forests to construct and heat their 
homes, make fences, and build tobacco hogsheads1' (198 6,4 7-48).
However, if planters combatted soil depletion by ac­
quiring new land, then demand for new land due to soil 
depletion would show up as a function of production land. 
(Only land planted in tobacco would be subject to depletion.) 
This could be proxied in two different ways: either as a
proportion of cumulative patent acreage, or, perhaps even 
better, as a proportion of the total labor force (since any
laborer could only work 2-3 tobacco acres annually).
In either case, the effect of soil depletion would show 
up in the coefficients of Malthusian factors rather than 
staples factors. Under the "optimum density" concept, there
would be demand for new land when the population density was
greater than optimum and no demand for new land when popula­
tion density was less than optimum. Thus, in the long run, 
the population density would tend to stabilize around the 
optimum density. Under the Craven hypothesis, demand for land 
would show up best as a fixed positive fraction of the tobacco 
labor force, approximately one acre per year for each tobacco 
laborer.
Population Density and Optimum Density
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In order to study whether the concept of optimum popu­
lation density works in the colonial Chesapeake, we first need 
to study how population density in the Chesapeake changed over 
time. Two major problems in calculating population densities 
are (1) the definition of what land and population should be 
included and (2) the determination of the actual quantity of 
that land and population. Land could be defined, as Easterlin 
does, as all "potentially cultivable land in a given area" 
(72) , but then the problem would be to define the area, for 
colonial Virginia theoretically stretched to the Pacific 
Ocean. Population could be defined as either labor force 
population or total population.
For colonial Virginia, the two most convenient options 
for determining the proper acreage would be to use either 
quit-rent acreage or cumulative patent acreage as an estimate 
of "owned" acreage, the "potentially cultivable land" to the 
present frontier. Both options have their drawbacks. Quit- 
rent acreages, as shown in the section on land speculation, 
tend to underestimate "owned" acreage, especially before 1684. 
Although cumulative patent acreage can be determined after 
1660 from the land patent data base, determining pre-1660 
cumulative acreage is problematical. Alternatively, one could 
use modern county soil maps, as several historians have done 
for local studies (Walsh 408-412; Earle 24-30), or 19th and
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2 0th century census improved acreage totals used by others for 
overall studies (Easterlin 47-51; Yasuba 158-169), but it may 
not be advisable to apply latter-day concepts of "potentially 
cultivable land" to 17th century planters and to use such 
information would require an analysis of local land use beyond 
the scope of this study.
Annual tithable population totals for Virginia have been 
developed by Menard (1980,157-161), based on the earlier work 
of Edmund Morgan. The definition of a tithable changed 
slightly over the 17th century but it basically was a measure 
of the labor, force, including all males and black females aged 
sixteen years and over. For several reasons, tithable totals 
are preferable to total population totals. First, the colony 
only kept records on tithables. Estimates of total population 
in the 17th century are interpolations based on data from two 
total censuses in 1625 and 1699. Second, and even more 
importantly, the tithable population might be the "preferred" 
population for consideration in testing the Malthusian 
hypothesis. The tithable population is the population that 
works the land. Although planters may need more land to raise 
a family, there is only so much acreage that a planter himself 
can tend before he needs an additional laborer. Nevertheless, 
planters may obtain additional acreage with the expectation 
of establishing a family farm, leaving an inheritance for 
their children, and allowing their grown children to live 
nearby. Most historians must not believe that the concept of
80
a "family farm" heavily influenced the development of the 
colonial Chesapeake, since all estimates of optimum density 
for the colonial Chesapeake, past and present, have essential­
ly been expressed in terms of the tithable population. 
However, since much of the Malthusian influenced work has 
emphasized total population density (Rutman,1975,271), perhaps 
because of the New England emphasis on family farms and family 
inheritance, total population cannot be ignored.
For the purpose of testing the concept of optimum 
density, because of the problems associated with each method, 
population densities were calculated in several ways. Table 
VII presents population densities for the entire colony based 
on the method of headright-estimated acreage described in the 
section on quit-rent analysis. Table VIII uses the same 
technique, but reflects only land south of the Rapphannock 
River. Table IX also reports population density for land 
south of the Rappahannock River but cumulative acreage is 
interpolated between the 1663 and 1704 quit-rent totals using 
a 81.5% correction factor to convert patent acreage into 
quit-rent acreage. The tithable totals were determined using 
Edmund Morgan's tithable totals, correction factors, and ratio 
of tithables to total (1973,367-368).1
Tithable totals for land south of the Rappahannock 
were determined from county totals reported in Greene and 
Harrington for 1682 and 1699 (145-146) and in the Blathwayt
Papers, Vol. XVII, Colonial Williamsburg, for 1673. The ratio 
of tithables to total for land south of the Rappahannock was 
slightly adjusted based on 1699 county totals.
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TABLE VII
TOTAL VIRGINIA POPULATION DENSITY 
(ACRES/UNIT POPULATION) BASED ON 
INITIAL HEADRIGHT ESTIMATED ACREAGE
Year
1644 1653 1662 1674 1682
Cumulative 
Acreage
Uncorrected 
Total 
Tithables
Uncorrected
Tithable 102.9 129.3 167.3 238.0 230.1
Density
Corrected
Tithable 97.8 122.3 157.8 224.4 205.2
Density
Corrected
Total
Population 55.6 64.0 77.0 99.7 86.6
Density
449852 929566 1980529 3186721 3488194
4370 7190 11838 13392 15162
1699
4022941
21956
183 . 2
172 . 9
64 . 0
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TABLE VIII
POPULATION DENSITY SOUTH OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK 
(ACRES/UNIT POPULATION) BASED ON 
INITIAL HEADRIGHT ESTIMATED ACREAGE
Year
1662 1674 1682 1699
1476581 2366598 2610601 3144923Cumulative Acreage
Uncorrected Total 
Tithables
Uncorrected Tithable 
Density-
Corrected Tithable 
Density
Corrected Total
Population Density
9593 10852 12432 17093
153.9 218.1 210.0 184.0
145.2 205.7 187.5 173.6
67.9 87.5 75.6 61. 6
TABLE IX
POPULATION DENSITY SOUTH OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK 
(ACRES PER UNIT POPULATION) BASED ON 
1663 AND 1704 QUIT-RENT ACREAGE
Year
1662 1674 1682 1699
654476 1384307 1599356 2061563Cumulative Acreage
Uncorrected Total 
Tithables
Uncorrected Tithable 
Density
Corrected Tithable 
Density
Corrected Total
Population Density
9593 10852 12432 17093
68.2 127.6 128.6 120.6
64.4 120.3 114.9 113.8
30.1 51.2 46.3 40.3
Source: See text.
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All of the methods of calculating inverse population 
density seem to show a general trend: increasing dramatically 
through the 1670s, levelling off in the 1680s, and declining 
in the 1690s. Tables VII and VIII provide more realistic 
estimates of population density than Table IX, since quit- 
rent rolls underestimate cumulative acreage. Except for the 
1662 estimate in Table IX, all calculated tithable population 
densities are well above 100 acres per tithable and thus far 
exceed 2 0 acre or 50 acre optimum acreages and show no trend 
toward declining to such low values.
But the concept of optimum density is not really meant 
to address the entire region of settlement, only subdivisions 
within the region of settlement. Earle focuses on one parish 
in Maryland and Rutman focuses on towns in New Hampshire. 
Even Kulikoff refers to "tidewater Virginia" or "southern 
Maryland," not the entire area of settlement of Virginians or 
Marylanders (1986,4849). For 17th century Virginia, the 
closest approximations would be an analysis of population 
densities at the county level, as presented in Table X for the 
years 1674 and 1699. In order to determine whether an optimum 
density operated as- a "homeostatic governor" in colonial 
Virginia as Rutman found in colonial New Hampshire towns 
(1975,279), the counties in Table X were arranged into natural 
density groupings, following the logic of Wetherell's hierar­
chical clustering recommendations (1977,109-116). The
population change from 1674 to 1699 for each grouping was then
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TABLE X
POPULATION DENSITY (ACRES/TITHABLE) BY COUNTY 
BASED ON QUIT-RENT TOTALS
County 1674 1699
Accomack 281.3 232 . 2
Charles City 104 . 4 83 . 1
Elizabeth City 81.9 63 . 6
Gloucester 68. 4 58 . 4
Henrico 135. 5 190. 6
Isle of Wight 143.9 169 . 5
James City 121. 8 102 . 7
Lower Norfolk 129 . 0 157 . 2
Middlesex 84 . 6 73 . 0
Nansemond 62 . 5 143 . 5
New Kent 77 . 8 126. 3
Northampton 306 . 3 192 . 4
Surry 172 . 5 165 . 9
Warwick 77 . 0 78 . 9
York 56. 1 55.9
Source: See text.
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calculated so that the effect of density on population growth 
could be analyzed. Table XI lists results based on 1674 
density groupings and Table XII lists results based on 1699 
density groupings (the preferred case since later quit-rent 
acreages are more accurate giving greater confidence to 1699 
county density calculations and groupings).
Tables XI and XII reflect the general trend that Rutman 
found for New Hampshire of increasing population density (or 
decreasing inverse population density) leading to smaller 
population increases. However, the pattern is not nearly so 
clean, although some of this can be blamed on the small size 
of the sample. The groupings by density tend to create some 
strange bedfellows. Table XI combines in the 50-75 group: 
York County, where both acreage and population stabilized; 
Nansemond County, where acreage increased rapidly but popu­
lation stabilized; and Gloucester County where both acreage 
and population showed steady growth. Population growth rates 
for the years 1674 to 1699 were 13.7%, -2.6%, and 49.0%
respectively.
The concept of optimum density is problematic for the 
colonial Chesapeake because the concept implicitly assumes a 
fixed area of analysis, whether it be a parish, township, 
county, or "tidewater Virginia." The problem is, again, in 
defining "potentially cultivable land." Warwick and York 
counties, which by New Hampshire standards appear closest to 
an optimum density (both land and population stabilized), had
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Source:
TABLE XI
PERCENT POPULATION CHANGE (1674-1699) 
BASED ON 167 4 DENSITY GROUPING
Density N Percent
Group Change
Population
50-75 3 20.0
75-100 4 56.5
100-150 5 69.6
150+ 3 60.6
See text.
TABLE XII
PERCENT POPULATION CHANGE (1674-1699) 
BASED ON 1699 DENSITY GROUPING
Density
Group
N Percent
Change
Population
50-70 3 36.1
70-100 3 53 . 5
100-150 3 46 . 9
150-190 3 67 . 8
190+ 3 67 . 7
Source: See text.
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on the quit-rent rolls only 78.4% and 76.9% of their available 
land area, as shown in Table V. In both Warwick and York, 
land continued to be patented from 1674 to 1699, albeit only 
5666 and 7109 acres respectively.2
The concept of optimum density must assume that the 
population is fairly evenly distributed over the area under 
consideration. If the population is concentrated in only one 
part of the region, as is the situation in a frontier county, 
then the population faces a much different "population 
pressure" than the calculated population density might 
indicate. To avoid this problem, patented land is used as the 
basis for determining population densities, rather than modern 
(or even 17th century) legal definitions of county boundaries. 
However, choosing patented lands as the basis means that the 
basis can change and thus the population density of a region 
might change independent of population changes. This is the 
case for Nansemond County where tithable population decreased 
by 2.6%, yet inverse population density increased from 62.5 
to 143.5 acres per tithable, simply because more acreage was 
added to the quit-rent rolls.
The basic problem is that optimum density, the way Rutman 
defines it for New Hampshire towns, only explains population 
growth whereas, for the colonial Chesapeake, we are interested
However, a tract map of 17 04 York County at the 
Colonial Williamsburg Foundation shows no available unpatented 
land for York County.
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in both land acquisition and population growth and the inter­
relationship between the two. For the colonial Chesapeake, 
the Malthusian model advocated by Richard A. Easterlin may 
serve better. In Easterlin's hypothesis, population density 
is just a proxy for farm values, or more simply, land costs. 
Higher population density leads to high land costs and 
subsequent reduced returns on investments which stimulates 
out-migration. Unfortunately, more work is needed to study 
local changes in population and land prices in 17th century 
Virginia before such a thesis can be tested.
For studies of new land acquisition, the concept of 
population density might work on a colony-wide basis; the 
general rise in land prices drives people to the frontier for 
less expensive land. But the concept of population density 
would seem illsuited to determining the specific frontier that 
patentees would choose. The land patent system equalized 
price of land at the frontier but the frontier could represent 
quite different types of land in different counties. Since 
the patentees would have had only limited knowledge of avail­
able land, perhaps such decisions were based on other criteria 
such as proximity to present location, personal contacts, etc.
It is conceivable that population change could be 
directly correlated with both population density and land 
prices. Figure I is a time plot of inverse tithable popula­
tion density and new land patent acquisition. The upturn in 
land acquisition after 1700 might be attributed to the sharp
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drop in acres per tithable. People migrated from higher 
priced, more dense areas to lower priced, less dense areas. 
This implies a simple supply-demand market for land. Kevin 
Kelly believes that the key to the tremendous increase in land 
acquisition in Surry County in the 1680s was "that its 
available interior land was inexpensive" (1979, 197). But
does this explain the tremendous increase in patents there as 
well? As Kelly points out, these people are not speculating 
(1979,190). Why would people patent land in an area where 
land values were cheap? Wouldn't they patent the best land 
they could get?
Why people chose to patent land in different areas at 
different times is uncertain. Kelly believes that Surry only 
gained popularity after the Middle Peninsula and the Northern 
Neck lost their attraction (1979,197). As he points out "it 
was, after all, a change in the attitudes of prospective 
settlers toward Surry, and not a change in the conditions 
within the county— its geography, its unproductive soil, its 
relative lack of affluence--that affected its settlement" 
(Kelly,1979,204). Although we can hypothesize about why 
certain regions became "popular" at different times, why 
speculators and settlers were attracted to one region or 
another, the answer certainly is much more complicated than 
can be explained by population density.
The concept of an optimum density for the colonial Chesa­
peake is unrealistic unless one wants to consider an optimum
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density which varies radically from place to place and time 
to time. Although this might be accounted for by changes in 
attitudes towards mobility, it is hardly likely. The closest 
concept to Rutman1s optimum density might be the average 
density when a region changes from net in-migration to 
net-outmigration. For the Rutmans' Middlesex County, this 
occurred in the mid-1690s (1984,34) when inverse tithable
density was about 7 0 acres per tithable. York County seemed 
to stabilize around 56 acres per tithable. Clearly more work 
at the local level will be necessary to verify such an optimum 
density. But even if identified, such an optimum density 
would address neither the tremendous turnover in people who 
emigrated from and immigrated to counties in spite of popula­
tion density nor the steady rise in population density that 
occurred in almost all colonial Chesapeake counties over time 
due to natural increase.
Rather than an optimum density, we must think of "popu­
lation pressure" as a relative concept, not an absolute 
concept. As Lewis Gray said, "the scarcity of land in older 
areas was not absolute, but relative to the great abundance 
of fertile land available in the frontier regions." "There 
was a tendancy with the passage of time for the older areas 
to develop a relative scarcity of easily available land of 
highest desirability, as a result of occupancy, progressive 
exhaustion of soil by single cropping, and the practice of 
holding large reserves...As this relative scarcity developed,
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it motivated emigration and gave rise to some tenancy" 
(2:640-1).
CHAPTER IV
STAPLES FACTORS
The general organization of this analysis of staples 
factors of land acquisition follows the logic of Stanley 
Lebergott's essay "The Demand for Land: The United States,
1820-1860."
Expected Income from Land
"Expected income over the long term depends on the real 
price of the land's products" (Lebergott 197). As cotton was 
by far the major product of the land in the antebellum South, 
Lebergott proxied expected income using the deflated price of 
cotton in Charleston. "As real cotton prices rose so did land 
sales (t=3.7)" (201). Gavin Wright developed an alternative
demand function for new land and likewise found "significant 
elasticity with respect to the cotton price" (116).
This should come as no surprise as most economic his­
torians who have examined the antebellum era have noted the 
great role that cotton played in the development of the United 
States. "The vicissitudes of the cotton trade— the specula­
tive expansion of 1818, the radical decline in prices in the
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1820's and the boom in the 1830's— were the most important 
influence upon the varying rates of growth of the economy 
during the period [1815-1860]" (North 67). As summarized by 
Walton and Robertson: "It was of course the expected return
on cotton that brought the great, irregular surges of movement 
into the southwest, and [as shown in a graph by North (124)] 
there is a close correlation between the price of cotton on 
the one hand and the volume of public land sales in Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas on the other" 
(199) .
Any comparable study for the colonial Chesapeake suffers 
because tobacco price information is very meager and is often 
contradictory. The only series which can be used judiciously 
for the time period in question is Russell R. Menard's series 
of farm prices of Maryland tobacco 1659-1710 (1973b,85). He
documents well the problems involved in developing such a 
series (1973b,80-81). However, using "a consistent and 
comprehensible source"-evaluations in inventories of estates—  
"there is every reason to believe that these evaluations 
reflect the current market value of tobacco" (1973b,82).
Menard believes that "although this price series is based 
on Maryland materials, there is no reason to assume that it 
cannot also be applied to Virginia" (1973b,84). He recog­
nizes, though, that sweet-scented tobacco "brought prices as 
much as 50% higher than those paid for the coarser oronoco 
leaf" of Maryland (1973b, 84). The Rutmans showed that
95
Middlesex County tobacco prices were very different as the 
county shifted from oronoco to sweetscented tobacco. "In the 
167 0s the two areas [Maryland and Middlesex] were about equal, 
but by the 1690s Middlesex tobacco prices were roughly 13 0 
percent of Maryland prices while in the first decade of the 
new century the differential neared 150 percent." Thus 
"planters moving to sweetscented in the 1660s and 167 0s were 
spared the price collapse of the 1680s" (1984,5). However,
as the Rutmans note, "there was a limit to which the sweet- 
scented supply could grow inasmuch as the variety had a 
restricted geographic range in the Chesapake. While oronoco 
would grow anywhere, sweetscented prospered only on the penin­
sulas between the James and Rappahannock rivers, an area 
largely settled and in production by 1700" (1984,6).
The effect of the introduction of sweet-scented tobacco 
on demand for land is hard to determine. The area "between 
the James and Rappahannock rivers" is quite large and the 
timing and distribution of sweet-scented tobacco production 
is not very certain. Certainly if Middlesex is any example 
then sweet-scented tobacco had almost no effect on new land 
acquisition since relatively little new land was left to be 
taken up after sweet-scented tobacco was brought into the 
county in the early 1660s. York, Warwick, and Elizabeth City 
Counties on the Lower Peninsula had even less land left to 
take up by the 1660s. However, the upper sections of the 
Lower and Middle peninsulas were expanding rapidly during this
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time period. Was this upper region settled with the intention 
of growing sweet-scented or oronoco tobacco? "Old" Rappahan­
nock County which spread on both sides of the Rappahannock 
River showed the highest rate of land acquisition in Virginia 
in the 1660s, tapering off in the 1670s, but the rate was 
actually higher on the north side of the river where supposed­
ly sweet-scented was not grown (13,390 acres/yr vs 9,350 
acres/yr for the years 1662-1672, excluding all patents for 
which location was uncertain). Accomack and Northampton 
Counties on the Eastern Shore, where oronoco was grown, had 
only slightly lower rates of land acquisition during this 
period (9,650 and 7,620 acres/yr respectively). South of the 
James River, where only oronoco was grown, and Gloucester 
County, where sweetscented was grown, both had lower land 
acquisition rates which continued steadily through the 17th 
century.
A comparative analysis of land acquisition in the sweet- 
scented counties using Menard's oronoco price series and a 
sweet-scented price series provided by Lorena Walsh (based 
mostly on York County data for the 17th century) showed that 
Menard's oronoco series produced a more statistically signi­
ficant correlation. The statistical difference probably 
reflects the scanty price data presently available on sweet- 
scented tobacco, but could reflect the primary importance of 
oronoco tobacco during the land acquisition phase of the 
Peninsula and Middle Peninsula.
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Since the effect of sweet-scented tobacco on land 
acquisition is uncertain (and until better data is developed), 
Menard's oronoco tobacco price series will serve as the best 
proxy for Chesapeake land acquisition studies. Figure II is 
a plot of the annual Virginia new land patent acreage and 
Maryland farm tobacco prices, and like North's plot for the 
antebellum South (124), the two curves show a great deal of 
similarity. The upturn in new land acquisition after 1700, 
that in Figure I seemed correlated with a sharp decline in 
inverse population density, here seems strongly correlated 
with a sharp rise in tobacco prices.
Unlike North and Wright, Lebergott uses a "deflated" 
price of cotton in his analysis. Certainly any study of 
prices as a proxy for expected income should consider the 
effect of inflation or deflation. "Farming provided a cushion 
to buffer people in times of recession...but most colonists, 
to a greater or lesser extent, bought and sold in the market­
place and thus felt the impact of the cycles of expansion and 
contraction" (McCusker 66). Unfortunately, there are no 
generally accepted consumer price indices for calculating 
deflated tobacco prices for the time period in question. 
Those indices that do exist are constantly being modified to 
reflect new data. However, all of the consumer price index
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series in general use show strong linear trends.1 Since there 
is disagreement about the correct consumer price index, 
nominal prices rather than deflated prices were used for the 
bulk of this study, but deflated prices (using an index 
provided by Lorena Walsh of the Colonial Williamsburg Founda­
tion) were run as an alternative test case.
Expected Capital Gains
"The value of farm land may well rise with the real price 
of crops. But capital gains in land can also derive from 
changes in the price of complementary services. Most notable 
of these is transport" (Lebergott 198). To index the improve­
ment in transportation, Lebergott creatively (perhaps ques­
tionably) employs the federal expenditure on the Mississippi 
river system (199) . Overall, for the late 17th century, 
expected capital gains should have declined as patents were 
sought further and further from navigable streams, thus 
increasing transportation costs. "Difficulties of transport 
as expansion moved westward constituted another influence 
tending to increase demand for land in more accessible 
districts" (Gray 1:404). Walsh shows that "planters showed
1 Thus in models where a separate time trend is included 
with tobacco prices, t-statistics on tobacco price are not 
changed by the use of deflated prices; the effect of deflated 
prices merely shows up in the significance of the time trend. 
See Appendix II for explanation of the importance of t-statis­
tics .
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little interest in acquiring holdings in the interior" away 
from direct water access (1977,405). "The bulkiness of the 
leaf in shipment made easy access to water carriage most 
desirable" (Wyckoff 87) and thus interior lands would have 
been less valuable. However, if increasing land transporta­
tion costs were more than offset by decreasing water transpor­
tation costs (due to more efficient hogshead packaging, 
reduced port times, economies of scale, etc.), then it is 
possible that expected capital gains could have risen during 
this time period.
In Wyckoff's study of Maryland land values, he finds that 
values for both improved and unimproved land rose steadily 
throughout the 17th century (86). However, his focus seems 
to be strictly "waterfront properties," (87), and he does not 
provide any breakdown by county, water access, land policy, 
demographic growth, etc. A better understanding of these 
effects is revealed in a study of Surry County, Virginia, a 
growing 17th century county quite representative of colonial 
Virginia. Kevin Kelly found Surry's land prices much lower 
than Maryland's, except for a curious surge in the 1670s (see 
Figure III) . The relationship between this price surge and 
new land patent acreage is remarkable. When new land was 
being patented land prices remained flat; but when new land 
was not being patented, land prices rose, dramatically so in 
Surry County in the 167 0s when the population was rising 
rapidly. This long hesitation in new land acqusition in Surry
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County was unusual in its duration although many counties 
showed similar hesitations during the years surrounding 
Bacon's rebellion. Whatever the reason for the hesitation, 
when land patents resumed, land prices came back down. When 
land patents again declined in the 1690s, land prices began 
to rise again, but this time at a much slower rate and to a 
much lower level, probably reflecting the reduced desirability 
of remaining lands further from water transport. Similar 
rises in land prices at the end of patenting appear in other 
counties in the Chesapeake (for example Charles County 
[Walsh,1979,402-410]).
Wyckoff shows further that the net value of improved land 
over unimproved land was fairly stable in the late 17th 
century: 12 pounds of tobacco per acre in the 1670s; 11 in
the 1680s; 13 in the 1690s (86). Thus, overall there seems
to be little change in capital gains to land acquisition in 
the 17th century. As population increased, more land was made 
available, keeping the price of land quite stable in develop­
ing regions. A man could make a profit improving his home­
stead, selling it, and moving on, but there was little more 
advantage in the 1660s than 1690s.
Supply Price of Land
As in Lebergott's analysis, there were three elements in 
the price of land in the colonial Chesapeake: explicit price,
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implicit price, and terms of sale. The explicit price was one 
headright for each grant of fifty acres (or the payment of a 
treasury right after 1699), plus some substantial fees.
Before 1666, surveyors fees were restricted by colonial 
statute to "twenty pounds of tobacco for every one hundred 
acres laid off" with a minimum fee of one hundred pounds of 
tobacco. After 1666, the fees were raised to forty pounds 
for each one hundred acres with a new minimum of four hundred 
pounds of tobacco. In addition, if the surveyor was "com­
pelled to go so far from the place where he resided as to 
render return impossible in a day,...he was allowed thirty 
pounds of tobacco for every twenty-four hours included in the 
period of absence from home. If, to arrive at the place where 
the new plantation was to be laid off, he was forced to travel 
by water, the expenses of his transportation were to be borne 
by the person employing him" (Bruce 547-548). For the entire 
time period 1660-1706 the secretary's fees for drawing and 
recording a patent was 80 pounds of tobacco with an additional 
30 pounds for a personal copy (Hening 1-463;2-144;2-355;4-60). 
During the governorship of Francis Lord Howard in the 1680s 
a fee of two hundred pounds of tobacco was charged for 
attachement of the seal of the Colony but this was discon­
tinued in 1689 (Bruce 549-550) . Fortunately for the small 
planter, these fees were not due until after the first crop 
of tobacco was produced, at which point it was collected by 
the Sheriff of the County (Beverley 278; Bruce 547-548).
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The implicit price differed from explicit price because, 
as many historians have noted, headrights were a highly 
marketable commodity (Menard 324). Morgan found, in a study 
of six counties, that "a majority,though a small majority, of 
the [headright] certificates were used by the persons who 
initially obtained them" (363). Morgan believes that the 
great land acquisition surges in Virginia were financed by 
"drawing on a reservoir of unclaimed headrights. As the 
population of the colony rose, whether from a decline in death 
rate, from an increase in birth rate, or from an increase in 
immigration, it required no great acumen to foresee that land, 
hitherto abundant and not highly prized, would rise in value. 
Those who operated on a large enough scale to plan ahead 
accordingly began to gather and claim headrights. It did not 
cost them much— the going rate in the 1650s seems to have been 
40 or 50 pounds of tobacco per headright. The rights for a 
thousand acres would have cost no more than a couple of cows 
or a couple of featherbeds" (368-369).
Morgan's estimate of the cost of headright certificates 
is based on a meager sample of two probate records, but it is 
not unreasonable. By 1692, according to contemporaries 
Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton, the "clerks in the office of 
the Secretary of the Colony [fell] into the grossly illegal 
habit of selling these rights to all who would pay from one 
to five shillings for each right, without any pretension being 
made that the buyer had complied with the law by bringing in
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immigrants himself or by purchasing certificates from persons 
who had done so" (Bruce 523-524) . At a pence per pound of 
tobacco, these fees are in line with Morgan's estimates of the 
market cost of headrights. Similarly, in 1699, the treasury 
right was set at "five shillings paid in coin" for each right 
of fifty acres (Voorhis 90).
The calculation of land price is further complicated by 
the widespread abuse of the headright system. Besides the 
clerks' acceptance of fees mentioned above, others have noted 
fictitious headrights, seamen or frequent travellers claiming 
themselves multiple times, and shipmasters and importers 
claiming rights for the same servants. According to Governor 
Spotswood, "for one individual who was brought over to 
Virginia, two hundred acres were frequently obtained by 
different persons" (Bruce 522). "The perversion was pushed 
so far that head rights were granted upon the presentation of 
lists of names copied from old books of record" (Bruce 523).
As Bruce has noted, "these abuses crept in with the 
general consent" (524). The demand for land was greater than 
the supply of headright certificates. Using the computer data 
base to search for common name patterns among headrights, I 
calculate that approximately thirty percent of the Virginia 
headrights listed in the land patents were duplicates. A 
third of this number are easily identified as the serial form 
of abuse mentioned by Bruce, where names are apparently copied 
from "old books of record." The other two-thirds are esti­
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mated from the percentage reappearance of names so uncommon 
as not likely to be different people with the same name.2 
Contrary to most historians, though, I find this abuse 
dominant, not just in the later years of the 17th century, but 
from the mid-1660s to 1706. Extension of the patent data base 
before 1660 undoubtedly would help discover additional abuse 
in earlier time periods. The abuse was generally spread 
through all counties and among all types of patentees, 
although large patentees had a slightly greater proportionate 
share of the abuse.
The total cost for patenting five hundred acres (an 
average patent size) could thus amount to over a thousand 
pounds of tobacco. With annual labor productivity averaging 
about 1600 pounds of tobacco per person (Menard,1980,145), 
this represented a substantial part of a small planter's first 
tobacco crop. There is no indication, however, that the 
explicit or implicit costs of land acquisition varied during 
the time period 1660-1706 (except for the increase in sur­
veyor's fees in 1666).
Quality of Land: Indian Cessions
Lebergott believes that "each additional Indian cession 
[of land]... improved the quality of federal land, thus
See Appendix I for explanation of namecoding system 
and methods employed to identify headright abuse.
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implicitly cutting its price," as fears of Indian attack were 
reduced (Lebergott 201). As Indian tribes ceded land to the 
United States in the antebellum South, so was Indian land 
opened up to settlement in the colonial Chesapeake. In order 
to preserve the peace with the Indians and to keep the 
population of the colony as compact as possible, "except 
during the early years of the seventeenth century, there was 
always a limit beyond which settlement was not legally allowed 
to proceed" (Voorhis 73). As Gray notes, "although the 
irrepressible squatter might penetrate areas still within the 
scope of Indian tribal rights, the majority of settlers were 
compelled to await extension of the frontier through succes­
sive treaties of cession" (1:404).
The only major Indian acquistion during the time period 
under study was in 1688 when "the tribes residing in Pamunkey 
Neck and on the south side of Blackwater River, offered a 
petition to the Assembly, in which they urged that all lands 
in their vicinity they were unable to use should be granted 
to the English, not only as a means of protection to the 
petitioners, but also a relief to them in their indigent 
conditions" (Bruce 1:499). A study of the early land acqui­
sition phase of the Pamunkey Neck offers an excellent example 
of the effect such Indian acquisitions had on both speculation 
and general land acqusition.
Lying at the head of the York River, between the Matta- 
poni and Pamunkey Rivers, the Pamunkey Neck became part of
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King & Queen County when that county was formed in 1691. On 
25 October 1695, four colonial leaders: Col. Edward Hill; Col. 
Richard Johnson; Ralph Wormeley, Esqr., Secretary of Virginia; 
and Edmond Jenings, Esqr., patented a total of 22,595 acres, 
the first land in the Pamunkey Neck (Nugent 3:1-3). Unfor­
tunately they had jumped the gun because King William had 
given first choice of 10,000 acres to the "Royall Colledge of 
William & Mary in Virginia" (Nugent 3:31). They were forced 
to surrender their land in October 1696, only to take up the 
same in October 1699. Thus an Indian cession in 1688 helped 
contribute to a peak in new land patent acreage in 1699. The 
opening up of land in the Pamunkey Neck directly contributed 
to the surge in land acquisition from 1699-1705, although 
tobacco prices were falling. King William County, formed in 
17 02 out of the Pamunkey Neck, was one the fastest growing 
counties in the early 18th century.
Quality of land considerations are not restricted to 
Indian cessions, but affect demand for land in all regions of 
the colonial Chesapeake. "Land values, of course, varied 
according to the grade of land in a particular area, espe­
cially in the distinction between upland and alluvial" (Gray 
1:405). Walsh shows that transport and quality usually went 
hand in hand; lands which lacked direct water access also, 
tended to be less suited to tobacco culture (1977,405,408). 
Thus, consideration of capital gains will not be based solely 
on transport, but must also take into account quality of land.
CHAPTER V
LAND ACQUISITION MODEL PRESENTATION AND ESTIMATION
The model presented here includes three basic equations 
for (1) land acquisition, (2) population change, and (3) 
tobacco prices. Land acquisition can serve as a dependent 
variable affected by such factors as population changes and 
tobacco prices, but land acquisition can in turn act as an 
independent variable affecting population changes and tobacco 
prices. Even more importantly for the purposes of this study, 
tobacco prices and population changes can have a quite signi­
ficant and immediate impact on each other. Before we can 
properly apply multiple regression techniques to an analysis 
of land acquisition, we must insure that, at any given time, 
there is no "simultaneous" interaction between the three vari­
ables, that we are truly able to distinguish the direction of 
the causal arrow. If we were not certain of the direction, 
then we would have to use more sophisticated statistical tools 
than multiple regression. Thus models of population change and 
tobacco prices will also be developed but, unfortunately, not 
as rigorously as the model of land acquisition because of a 
shortage of information about demographic processes and the 
tobacco market in the 17th century Chesapeake. For further
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explanation of the statistical techniques employed in this 
paper, see Appendix II.
Model of Land Acquisition in the Colonial Chesapeake
Based on the two theories— staples and Malthusian— and 
a general analysis of the associated factors and available 
data, the basic demand function for land has been written in 
terms of lagged price and lagged inverse population density 
and a time trend. The time trend will be used to capture 
linear changes in expected monetary return, effective supply 
price, and attitudes towards mobility for lack of more 
specific information; non-linear changes in these variables 
will be captured in the residual.
The basic demand function for land is thus:
ACRES = aO + al*TOBO-2 + a2*DENS-2 + a3*YEAR + u (1)
where
ACRES = new land patent acreage
TOBO-2 = nominal farm tobacco prices lagged by two years 
(pence sterling per pound of tobacco)
DENS-2 = TACR-2/POP-2
TACR-2 = cumulative patent acreage lagged by two years 
POP-2 = tithable population lagged by two years 
YEAR = patent year with 1664 as year 1
Ill
The base patent acreage was back-calculated from the 17 04 
quit-rent totals, including Northern Neck grants listed in the 
patents, but sensitivities were run based on alternative 
methods for determining base patent acreage. I also tested 
variations on this model using TOBO-2, DENS-2, TACR-2, and 
POP-2 in different combinations to test other plausible ways 
of deriving econometric models from the two theories. It is 
expected that the signs of TOBO-2 and POP-2 will be positive, 
while DENS-2, TACR-2, and YEAR will be negative. The time 
trend will be negative due to the reduced desirability of land 
further and further from navigable waters and due to reduced 
willingness to migrate as Chesapeake society matured. If the 
staples hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find a 
significant positive coefficient for tobacco price (TOBO-2). 
If the Malthusian hypothesis is correct, in this specification 
of the model, we would expect to find a significant negative 
coefficient for inverse population density (DENS-2).
Model of Population Change in the Colonial Chesapeake
In this era before the emergence of a stable native 
society, changes in population were mostly due to immigration 
from England. There is much disagreement among historians 
over how the labor market for indentured servants worked in 
the 17th century Chesapeake, especially over whether "push" 
or "pull" factors were more important. However, as with the
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question over the correct model for land acquisition, since 
most historians accept that both "push" and "pull" forces were 
at work, these forces shoud be tested within the context of 
one model. Using a lagged English wage index as a proxy for 
"push" factors and lagged tobacco prices for "pull11 factors, 
an equation for changes in population, plus a time trend to 
account for population changes due to natural increase, was 
developed:
DPOP = bO + bl*WAGE-l + b2*T0B0-l + b3*YEAR + V (2)
where
DPOP = change in tithable population from previous year
WAGE-1 = the Wrigley-Schofield English wage index lagged 
by one year
T0B0-1 = nominal farm tobacco prices lagged by one year
YEAR = tithable population year with 1664 as year 1.
The independent variables are lagged by one year because 
changes in population were due to the previous year's migra­
tion. The timing of harvests in both England and the Chesa­
peake and the physical time of transport across the Atlantic 
dictated a one year lag. However, the time lag of tobacco 
prices is not so clear cut because there are still a lot of 
unanswered questions about the 17th century European tobacco 
market. If English tobacco merchants were the major entrepre­
neurs in recruiting and marketing indentured servants and they
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foresaw increased demand for tobacco, there might be no time 
lag effect on prices. If Chesapeake tobacco planters were the 
major entrepreneurs in the servant trade, a tobacco price lag 
of two years might not be unreasonable. If emigration from 
the Chesapeake was a major factor in population changes, then 
no time lag might be reasonable as transient people chose to 
leave or stay based on current tobacco prices. Thus, alterna­
tive models with no time lag (TOBO-O) and a lag of two years 
(TOBO-2) on tobacco prices were also estimated. It is 
expected that the sign of TOBO and TIME (due to natural 
increase) will be positive, while the sign of WAGE-1 will be 
negative.
Model of Tobacco Prices in the Colonial Chesapeake
The price of tobacco is a function of both supply side 
and demand side factors, complicated by two markets separated 
by an ocean. Unfortunately, there is not enough information 
to determine independent equations for supply and demand. 
Insufficient data is available for overall tobacco production 
and for European tobacco prices. Most historians have assumed 
price-inelastic demand and income-inelastic demand for 
tobacco. Indeed, until there is better information on the 
17th century tobacco market, the best proxy for tobacco demand 
is a simple time trend. Although transportation costs and 
labor productivity may have changed over the course of the
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17th century, there are likewise no better estimates for these 
data than linear time trends. Thus the best model we have for 
farm tobacco prices includes lagged cumulative acreage and 
tithable population for supply side changes and a time trend 
for demand side and other changes:
TOBO = cO + cl*TACR—3 + c2*P0P-l + c3*YEAR + w (3)
where
TOBO = farm tobacco prices
TACR—3 = cumulative patent acreage lagged three years 
POP-1 = total tithable population lagged one year 
YEAR = tobacco price year with 1664 as year 1
Also tested was a variation of this model with the Wrigley- 
Schofield English wage index lagged by one year (WAGE-1) as 
a proxy for demand changes.
The population is lagged by one year because this year's 
tobacco price is based on last year's harvest. A time lag of 
three years for cumulative patent acreage is used as an 
approximation of how long it took for new patent acreage to 
be put into production. Having no better information for the 
antebellum South, Gavin Wright tried lags of two, three, and 
four years with little statistical difference (115). Douglass 
C. North noted "there was a lag of approximately four years 
between the peak in land sales and a large increase in cotton 
production" in the antebellum South (73). Lacking any better
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information for the colonial Chesapeake, lags of three years 
(TACR-3) and four years (TACR-4) were tested. It is expected 
that the signs of TACR-L and POP-1 will be negative, while the 
signs of WAGE-1 and YEAR will be positive (reflecting the 
increased demand for tobacco over time).
Estimation
Since the resultant system of equations involve lagged, 
predetermined variables, there is no problem of simultaneity. 
We may thus estimate the coefficients using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). To determine whether there are any autocor­
relation problems normally associated with such time series 
data, a Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistic is reported for each 
model.
Results
Land Acquisition (ACRES)
Table XIII contains the results of the OLS regression on 
ACRES using nominal farm tobacco prices. Based on
F-statistics, all of the models show statistical significance
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TABLE XIII
MODEL OF LAND ACQUISITION (ACRES)
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1664-1706
lodel Constant TOBO-2 DENS-2 TACR-2 POP-2 YEAR D.W.
1 296054* 1413 —  — 0.103* 3 .444 1946 1.91
(3.1) (0.1) — (3.8) (1.2) (1.2)
2 299667* — —  —0.104* 3 .468 1967 1.91
(4.6) — — (5.0) (1.2) (1.3)
3 278945* 19060 -1007* — — -2226* 1. 77
(3.6) (0.8) (3.8) — — (5.0)
* * ★
4 -1732 75745 — — — -1026 1.43
(0.1) (3.3) — — — (2.8)
4AR1 5996 70281* — — — -1123*
(0.2) (2.6) — — — (2.4)
5 227910* — -1130* — — -2497* 1.75
(7.3) — (5.3) — — (9.2)
6 200798* 9092 — —■0 . 078* 6 . 037* — 1. 84
(3.8) (0.4) — (4.5) (2.9) —
7 218589* — — —0.082* 6.386* — 1. 84
(12.2) — — (6.8) (3.5) —
8 -53503 117404* -60 — — — 1.29*
(1.0) (6.1) (0.3) — — —
9 -65774* 117847* — _ — — 1.29*
(3.5) (6.2) — — — —
10 88033 — -191 — — — 0. 60*
(1.4) - (0.6) - - -
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
R2 
0 .708
0 .708
0 . 686
0 . 572
0 .466
0 . 682
0 . 696
0 . 695
0.487
0 . 486
0 . 009
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
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at the 5% level of significance.1 The signs of the coeffi­
cients are all as expected, except for the time trend in 
Models 1 & 2, where it is statistically insignificant. Thus, 
the positive sign on the time trend of Models 1 & 2 is less 
certain than the negative sign on Models 3, 4 & 5. This would 
tend to support the belief that land acquisition was declining 
due to reduced desirability of land, even after taking into 
account both tobacco prices and population density.
The coefficients on population (POP) in Models 1 & 2 have 
the correct sign (increased population led to increased demand 
for land and vice-versa) but are statistically insignificant. 
Models 1 & 2 indicate that increased cumulative land patent 
acreage was more important in inhibiting further land acquisi­
tion than increased population was in promoting land acquisi­
tion .
A Chow test2 was run to test the contention that there 
was a transformation in the tobacco economy of late 17th 
century Virginia, that there was a different function for land 
acquisition in the first half (1664-1685) and the second half 
(1686-1706) of the time period under study. For all of the
Using Sargan's test (Maddala 210), the possible 
autocorrelation in Model 4 was determined to be an error 
specification problem, not a model specification problem. The 
error problem in Model 4 was corrected using an autoregression 
with a one year lag (Model 4AR1) and the results likewise 
presented in Table XI.
2 A Chow test is an "analysis-of-variance test" which 
tests whether the calculated coefficients are constant over 
the entire time period under study. For more information, see 
Maddala 130-137.
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models in Table XIII, there was no statistical difference 
between the two data sets at the 5% level of significance, 
thus rejecting the contention of a transformation.
The effect of tobacco prices on land acquisition is 
rather difficult to determine. Based on the models which 
combine both staples and Malthusian factors (1 & 3), tobacco 
prices would be dismissed as statistically insignificant. 
Dropping tobacco prices in Model 2 barely alters the results 
of Model 1. However, Models 4 & 4AR1 with land acquisition 
simply a function of tobacco prices and a time trend, essen­
tially the "staples" model, indicate statistical significance 
for the tobacco price coefficient at the 5% level of signi­
ficance. In such a situation, where the hypotheses are 
"nonnested since the explanatory variables under one of the 
hypotheses are not a subset of the explanatory variables in 
the other," the Davidson and MacKinnon's J-test is appropriate 
for testing the two hypotheses (Maddala 443-445). This test 
basically confirmed the results of Models 1 & 3 and led to 
rejection of the staples thesis and acceptance of the Mal­
thusian thesis. Thus, the Malthusian hypothesis seems 
well-supported by the study of land acquisition in the 
colonial Chesapeake.
Rejecting the staples thesis, either Malthusian Model 2 
or Model 5 could be considered appropriate. Model 5, the 
simplest of the Malthusian models, expressing land acquisition 
as a function of only inverse population density and a time
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trend, is in many respects the best model. The intercept is 
quite precisely determined and the time trend shows statisti­
cal significance. For statistical as well as aesthetic 
reasons, Model 5 is the preferred model.
Model 5 can be used to determine "optimum density," the 
inverse population density at which there would be zero demand 
for land. Setting YEAR=1, the optimum density for 1664 was 
199 acres per tithable; for YEAR=43, the optimum density for 
1706 was 107 acres per tithables. The strong linear decline 
in optimum density supports the hypotheses that optimum 
density was not a constant in the colonial Chesapeake and that 
attitudes towards mobility were becoming more restrictive with 
time.
Using deflated tobacco prices had negligible effect on 
the results (Table XIV). Excluding Northern Neck land grants 
did reduce the significance of the coefficients, but not 
enough to change the conclusions of this study. (Population 
estimates for the area south of the Rappahannock were based 
on Menard's annual tithable series corrected by linearly 
interpolated population ratios estimated from available county 
tithable lists.) For a proper analysis of land acquisition 
in colonial Virginia, the Northern Neck appears to play a 
significant role and the patent data should be enlarged to 
include available Northern Neck patent data.
The inverse population densities in Table XIII were 
calculated based on Craven's headrights for the years 1634-
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TABLE XIV
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF LAND ACQUISITION (ACRES) 
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1664-1706
Model Constant TOBO-2 DENS—2 YEAR D.W.
Base Case 278945*
(3.6)
19060
(0.8)
-1007*
(3.8)
-2226*
(5.0)
1.77
Deflated
Tobacco
Price
279235*
(3.7)
24312
(0.8)
-1003*
(3.8)
-2353*
(7.3)
1. 77
Total
Population
Density
321699*
(3.6)
21133
(0.9)
-2613*
(3.8)
-3598*
(4.8)
1.76
Post-1690 
Northern 
Neck Patents
300953*
(3.9)
14628
(0.6)
-1105*
(4.1)
-1956*
(4.6)
1.71
Non-
Northern 
Neck Patents
209018*
(2.9)
10388
(0.5)
-842*
(2.9)
*
-921
(2.8)
1.34*
Quit-Rent
Base
Acreage
208796*
(3.6)
9466
(0.4)
-1062*
(4.0)
-1168*
(3.8)
1.84
Lapsed
Land
-14680
(0.1)
-6804
(0.3)
-134
(1.9)
34
(0.3)
2 .20
Patents 
<500 Acres
67090*
(2.7)
5776
(0.7)
-245*
(2.9)
-477*
(3.4)
1.24*
Patents 
<1000 Acres
140161*
(3.5)
5779
(0.4)
-502*
(3.6)
-1017*
(4.4)
1.53*
Patents 
>1000 Acres
95913
(2.0)
12683
(0.6)
-482*
(2.2)
*
-619
(2.5)
1. 66
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
. 686 
. 687
. 686
. 644
.463
. 698
>.232 
. 536 
. 616 
(.505
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1658. Alternatively, density was calculated based on the 
lower quit-rent acreage and the results are listed in Table 
XIV and shows little statistical difference over the base 
case. This is to be expected as changing the base acreage 
merely shifts the cumulative acreage curve up and down and 
does not change its general shape.
Lapsed land acquisition, listed in Table XIV, shows a 
similar result to the other models, although the overall 
correlation is weaker. Population density, although barely 
insignificant at the 5% level of significance, still far 
outweighs the effect of tobacco prices. Interestingly, there 
is no significant time trend, indicating that the increases 
in lapsed land acquisition over time noted earlier were due 
mostly to declines in inverse population density.
The contention that the behavior of small patentees 
differed from large patentees was also tested and the results 
are also listed in Table XIV. The patents were divided into 
three groups: greater than or equal to 1000 acres, less than 
1000 acres, and less than 500 acres. Although the signi­
ficance of the coefficients declined with each sub-group, each 
sub-group fits the general model. If anything, large paten­
tees seem to be the least predictable group. Overall, though, 
it appears that the small planter/speculator responded to the 
same pushes and pulls as the large planter/speculator.
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Population Changes (DPOP)
Table XV contains the results of the OLS regression on 
population changes (DPOP) using nominal farm tobacco prices 
and the English wage index. The results are also presented 
graphically in Figure IV. Based on F-statistics, all of the 
models show statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance. The signs of the coefficients are all as 
expected, but not always statistically significant. Both 
graph and table indicate that tithable population grew most 
rapidly when English wages were low and tobacco prices high 
and tithable population grew least rapidly when English wages 
were high and tobacco prices low. All of the models show a 
statistically significant positive time trend which would be 
expected if natural increase was a growing part of population 
increase. Although colonial death crises may have signi­
ficantly impacted the rise in tithable population in some 
years, the effect of such crises was not significant enough 
to distort the relationship between population change, English 
wages, and tobacco prices.3
The significance of the coefficients of the lagged
3 However, as determined by a Park-Glejser test (Maddala 
162-167), the models are all heteroskedastic with time which 
may weaken the results. This heteroskedasticity in the resi­
duals is due to greater precision in the population data at 
the end of the time period. The early population figures are 
based on interpolated averages but the later figures are based 
on actual colony-wide census records which show greater 
fluctuations.
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TABLE XV
MODEL OF ANNUAL TITHABLE POPULATION CHANGE (DPOP) 
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1664-17 06
Model Constant WAGE-1 TOBO-O TOBO-1 TOBO-2 YEAR
1 -258.7 -2 . 36 1349* — — 26 . 3*
(0.2) (1.7) (2.3) — — (4.0)
2 -276.0 -2 . 54 — 1383* — 28 . 8*
(0.3) (2.0) — (2.8) — (4.4)
3 661.8 -3.27* — — 836 2 6.6*
(0.7) (2.5) (1.9) (3.7)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level
D.W. R2
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
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English wage index and lagged tobacco prices varies with each 
model. The theoretically most believable model, Model 2, also 
has the highest R2 and indicates statistical significance for 
both variables lagged one year. Further lags of tobacco price 
decrease the statistical significance of tobacco prices. This 
analysis indicates that "push" and "pull" factors were both 
important factors of population increase.
As with the land acquisition analysis, a Chow test4 was 
run to test the contention that there was a different function 
for population increase in the first half (1664-1685) and the 
second half (1686-1706) of the time period under study. For 
all of the models in Table XV, there was no statistical dif­
ference between the two data sets at the 5% level of signi­
ficance, thus rejecting the contention of a transformation.
Nominal Farm Tobacco Prices fTOBO)
Table XVI contains the results of the OLS regressions 
of lagged cumulative acreage (TACR) and population (POP) on 
TOBO. Based on F-statistics, all of the models show statis­
tical significance at the 5% level of significance. The 
intercept is statistically significant and the time trends 
are statistically insignificant at the 5% level of signi­
ficance. There is no significant difference between a three
4 See fn. 2.
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TABLE XVI
MODEL OF NOMINAL FARM TOBACCO PRICES (TOBO) 
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1664-1706
Model Const. TACR-3 TACR-4 POP-1 WAGE-1 YEAR D.W. R2
1 1.557* -0.280* - -.0068 - .0086 0.73* 0.454
(5.3) (2.4) - (0.4) - (0.9)
2 1.511* - -0.257* -.0081 - .0085 0.71* 0.456
(5.5) - (2.4) (0.5) - (0.9)
3 1.590* -0.151 - .0277 -0.0012* -.0066 1.16* 0.572
(6.0) (1.3) - (1-5) (3.2) (0.7)
4 1.550* - -0.139 .0255 -0.0012* -.0058 1.16* 0.577
(6.6) - (1-5) (1.3) (3.2) (0.6)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: TACR-3 and TACR-4 in millions of acres 
POP-1 in thousands of tithables
Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
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or four year lag in cumulative patent acreage. However, all 
of the models suffer from strong autocorrelation.
The signs on the coefficients of cumulative acreage 
(TACR) are correctly negative, but the signs for cumulative 
population (POP) are correct only for Models 1 & 2. The
coefficient on the English wage index is statistically 
significant but the sign is wrong since WAGE-1 is supposed to 
be an indicator of wage-induced demand for tobacco in England. 
If tobacco was wage inelastic, or the English tobacco demand 
was not a large part of the market, or the English wage index 
was not a good proxy for European wages, then we might expect 
this coefficient to be statistically insignificant. But this 
is not the case. The problem is believed to arise due to the 
strong effect of wages on immigration from England; lagged 
English wages are a much better indication of supply-side 
changes than demand-side changes. Thus, including WAGE-1 in 
the model obscures the effect of the other supply-side 
variables.
Either Model 1 or Model 2, then, is the preferred model, 
although both are rather poor. A Sargan's test5 indicated 
there were model specification problems at the 5% level of 
significance so a modified model was tested which included, 
as independent variables, tobacco prices lagged by one year 
(T0B0-1), average lagged cumulative patent acreage (TACRA),
5 See fn. 1.
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average lagged population (POPA) and a time trend (YEAR). 
After correcting this model for error specification problems, 
all of the coefficients were found to be insignificant.
Because using cumulative acreage and population might 
not capture the short-run fluctuations in supply-side changes, 
the model for tobacco prices was recalculated using annual 
patent acreage lagged three and four years (ACRE-3 and ACRE-4) 
and annual population changes lagged one year (DPOP-1) and the 
rsults reported in Table XVII. Based on F-statistics, all of 
the models show statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance. All of the intercepts are statisticaly signi­
ficant. The time trend is negative but statistically signifi­
cant at the 5% level of significance only in Model 1. Unlike 
the cumulative totals, annual changes show a statistical 
improvement in increasing the lag from three to four years.
However, all of the signs are incorrect and all of the 
models still indicate strong autocorrelation. Inclusion of 
the English wage index has noticeably less effect with annual 
changes than with cumulative totals reflecting the annual 
nature of the index. In an attempt to salvage this model of 
tobacco prices, the same tests and corrections were run as 
previously done for the other tobacco price models, with 
similar negative results. The final corrected model had no 
significant coefficients. Further work on the 17th century 
tobacco market will be required in order to resolve the 
problems presented by these tobacco price models.
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TABLE XVII
ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF NOMINAL FARM TOBACCO PRICES (TOBO) 
IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE, 1664-1706
Model Const. ACRE-3 ACRE-4 DPOP-1 WAGE-1 YEAR D.W.
1 0.985* 0.993 - .0091* - -.0058* 1.03* 0
(12.3) (1.5) - (2.5) - (2.7)
2 0.908* - 1.561* .0098* - -.0041' 1.09* 0
(11.0) - (2.5) (2.8) - (1.9)
3 1.385* 1.043 - .0710 -0.0008* -.0039 1.25* 0
(8.3) (1.7) - (2.0) (2.7) (1.9)
4 1.300* - 1.535* .0788* -0.0008* -.0024 1.34* 0.
(7.9) - (2.6) (2.4) (2.7) (1.2)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: ACRE-3 and ACRE-4 in millions of acres 
DPOP-1 in thousands of tithables
Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
. 490 
. 533 
|. 571 
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CHAPTER VI
ALTERNATIVE MODELS
This study has not determined the exact role of fluc­
tuations in the tobacco economy on growth and development of 
the colonial Chesapeake. Although rigorous hypothesis testing 
indicates that the importance of short-term fluctuations in 
tobacco prices has been over-emphasized, alternative models 
show significant effects of tobacco prices which at present 
cannot be explained. Table XVIII tests for the effect of 
various patent time lags and shows that with a four or five 
year time lag, tobacco prices had a significant effect on 
demand for land. Although there is no evidence that the 
patent process took anywhere near four years, decisions to 
patent land could have preceded formal patent application by 
several years and thus a patent lag of four years is not out 
of the question. However, the similarity of results for large 
patentees (who might have been more responsive to prices) and 
small patentees tends to make such time lags unlikely.
This analysis is confirmed by the sample of headright 
certificate totals from Accomack, Nortumberland, Lancaster 
and York counties, tested against the land demand model and 
presented in Table XIX. The similarity in the interweaving
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TABLE XVIII
LAND ACQUISITION (ACRES) IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE 
WITH VARIOUS PATENT LAGS, 1664-17 06
Lag Constant 
(Years)
TOBO-L TACR-L POP-L YEAR D.W. R‘
0 375166
(3.4)
-45457
(1.5)
-0.113 
(3.5)
5 . 06 
(1.7)
1032
(0.5)
1 382802*
(4.0)
-29869
(1.2)
-0 . 126* 
(4.6)
5 . 08 
(1.8)
1964
(1.2)
2 296054*
(3.1)
1413
(0.1)
-0.103* 
(3.8)
3 . 44 
(1.2)
1946
(1.2)
3 227121*
(2.5)
28121
(1.1)
-0.078* 
(3.2)
0 . 56 
(0.2)
2208
(1.4)
4 167239*
(2.1)
54916*
(2.1)
-0 . 054* 
(2.5)
-2 . 98 
(0.8)
2570
(1.7)
5 165359*
(2.1)
55252*
(2.1)
-0.045* 
(2.2)
-5. 69 
(1.3)
3094*
(2.1)
6 299797*
(3.5)
-7752
(0.3)
-0.062* 
(2.8)
-8 . 28 
(1.5)
4016*
(2.4)
7 451637*
(4.8)
-56905*
(2.2)
-0.081* 
(3.7)
-13 . 7 
(1.8)
5764*
(3.0)
8 363049*
(3.7)
-60006*
(2.1)
-0.067* 
(3.0)
-8 . 09 
(1.0)
3635
(1.9)
9 146959
(1.4)
3590
(0.1)
-0.037 
(1.6)
-1. 67 
(0.2)
1527
(0.7)
1.86 0.648
1.78 0.719
1.91 0.708
1.94 0.696
1.96 0.709
1.81 0.710
1.67 0.606
1.61 0.640
1.60 0.525
1.46 0.387
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
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TABLE XIX
HEADRIGHTS (HEAD) IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE
WITH VARIOUS PATENT LAGS, 1664-170
Lag
(Years)
Const TOBO-L TACR-L POP-L YEAR
0 3977*
(5.5)
-553*
(2.8)
-1.25*
(6.0)
19. 1 
(1.0)
33 . 2* 
(2.7)
1 3600*
(5.3)
-4 31* 
(2.4)
-1.20*
(6.2)
22 . 2 
(1.1)
32 . 8* 
(2.8)
2 2247*
(3.2)
-53 . 8 
(0.3)
-0.862* 
(4.3)
22 . 3 
(1.0)
22 . 8 
(1.9)
3 1118
(1.8)
322
(1.7)
-0.566* 
(3.2)
12 . 7 
(0.5)
17 . 6 
(1.6)
4 653
(1.2)
*
542
(3.0)
-0.393*
(2.6)
-13 . 1 
(0.5)
20.9*
(2.0)
5 1432*
(2.4)
167
(0.8)
-0.546* 
(3.4)
-17 . 4 
(0.5)
27.0*
(2.4)
6 2296*
(3.7)
-270
(1.4)
-0.727* 
(4.6)
-16. 1 
(0.4)
31. 7* 
(2.7)
7 2361*
(3.5)
-139
(0.7)
-0.672* 
(4.2)
-57 . 2 
(1.0)
42 . 2* 
(3.1)
8 1302*
(3.0)
-35.4
(0.3)
-0.306* 
(3.1)
-49. 1 
(1.4)
24 . 9* 
(2.9)
9 708
(1.9)
52 . 3 
(0.5)
-0.192* 
(2.2)
-29 . 6 
(0.9)
16. 6* 
(2.1)
D.W. R2
2.48 0.679
2.48 0.696
2.36 0.642
2.46 0.671
2.47 0.709
2.30 0.639
2.04 0.586
1.17 0.623
1.90 0.560
2.13 0.435
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses 
TACR-L in thousands of acres 
POP-L in thousands of tithables
Source: For headright certificates:
Accomack County (Nottingham, 1-64)
York County (Colonial Williamsburg abstracts) 
Northumberland County (Virginia Colonial 
Abstracts, County Order Books #4 & #5) 
Lancaster County (Virginia Colonial Abstracts, 
County Order Books #3, #3A & #4)
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effect of density and tobacco prices with different time lags 
confirms the conclusions of Table VI that acquisition of 
headrights preceded land acquisition by 0-1 years. Thus 
demand for headrights either coincides with or slightly lags 
behind demand for land (if one accepts a 1-2 year delay in 
the land patent process).
A much better explanation of the lagged effect of tobacco 
prices on land acquisition would be that tobacco prices have 
a lagged effect on the factors which affect demand for land. 
Although regression analysis shows no statistically sig­
nificant lagged relationship between tobacco prices and 
population density, perhaps tobacco prices affect other non- 
Malthusian factors of land demand. The lagged 4-5 year effect 
of tobacco prices on land acquisition could be seen as support 
for Clemens's hypothesis of a two-stage process of importing 
servants when tobacco prices were high and then acquiring 
additional land perhaps a couple of years later. Possibly the 
planter already had sufficient land from the previous cycle 
of servant importation and land acquisition to delay the 
acquisition of new land for 2-3 years.
However, other tests (presented below) show no such 
positive correlation between tobacco prices and servant 
importation. Using a model similar to that used to study 
population change (but with no time lags on the wage index), 
emigration from Bristol, England during the years 1654-1686 
was found to be negatively correlated with lagged tobacco
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prices, as shown in Table XX. This tends to support the 
conclusion of Lewis C. Gray, mentioned earlier, that planters 
were less concerned with making quick profits than with 
maintaining a certain income and they imported servants, not 
when tobacco prices were high, but when tobacco prices were 
low. This conclusion runs counter to the findings listed in 
Table XV for tithable population changes which were positively 
correlated with tobacco prices. As Menard found in his recent 
study of the Bristol emigration list, I also found a sig­
nificant negative relationship between the English wage index 
and emigration (Menard,1988,108n). The relationship between 
immigration, tobacco prices, and English wages is shown in 
Figure V.
This negative relationship between tobacco prices and 
English emigration might be dismissed as coincidental, except 
that the same negative correlations may also be found upon 
examination of Chesapeake unindentured servant registrations. 
Menard and Walsh have found positive correlation with tobacco 
prices when examining individual counties (Menard, 1973,326-8 ; 
1977,363-5; 1988, 115-117; Walsh,1977, 26-27), but when all
these servant registrations are examined in aggregate the 
results are quite different, as shown in Table XXI. In both 
Maryland and Virginia, masters were required to bring their 
unindentured servants (those who did not obtain indentures 
before leaving England) into the county court soon after 
acquiring them, and it was in the masters' best interest to
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TABLE XX
MODEL OF BRISTOL EMIGRATION TO THE CHESAPEAKE (BRIS)
AS FUNCTION OF LAGGED TOBACCO PRICES (TOBO-L), 1654-1686
Lag Constant TOBO-L WAGE YEAR D.W. R2
(Years)
10790 -82 . 6 -1. 27 -5.92 1.72 0 . 503
(2.1) (1.3) (3.3) (2.0)
16323* -145. 1* -1. 09* -9 .24* 1.93 0 .594
(3.5) (2.8) (3.2) (3.3)
20112* -170.8* -1.01* -11.5* 2 . 28 0. 645
(4.3) (3.6) (3.2) (4.1)
21638* -171.3* -1. 11* -12.4* 2 .42 0. 642
(4.2) (3.5) (3.6) (4.0)
21500* -163 . 0* -1.27* -12 . 3* 2 . 00 0 .626
(4.0) (3.3) (4.2) (3.8)
15330* -97 . 1 -1 . 44* -8.57* 1. 88 0 . 527
(2.4) (1.7) (4.3) (2.3)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: Bristol emigration (A.E.Smith,309)
Tobacco prices (Menard,1973b,85)
English wage index (Wrigley,642-643)
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TABLE XXI
CHESAPEAKE SERVANT REGISTRATIONS (REGIS) AS 
FUNCTION OF LAGGED TOBACCO PRICE (TOBO-L), 1660-1706
^g
lars)
Constant TOBO-L WAGE-1 YEAR D.W. R2
0 -2251
(1.3)
41.2
(0.6)
-0.584*
(2.9)
1. 53 
(1.5)
1.25* 0.227
1 -1365
(0.8)
-12 . 7 
(0.2)
-0.654* 
(3.3)
1. 06 
(1.0)
1.31* 0 .222
2 84 . 2 
(0.0)
-75.2
(1.4)
-0.703* 
(3.8)
0. 253 
(0.2)
1. 39* 0.256
3 1127
(0.7)
-96.2*
(2.4)
-0.707*
(4.0)
0. 350 
(0.4)
1.45* 0. 315
4 1409
(0.8)
-89 . 6* 
(2.5)
-0.671* 
(3.9)
0. 531 
(0.5)
1. 44* 0 . 318
5 946
(0.5)
-65 . 4 
(1.8)
-0.653* 
(3.7)
0.276
(0.2)
1.45* 0 .279
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: Charles, Northumberland, Talbot, Somerset, and 
Prince George County registrations 
(Menard,1975,159)
York and Lancaster County registrations 
(Menard,1977,365)
Tobacco prices (Menard,1973b,85)
English wage index (Wrigley,642-643)
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do so quickly to insure the maximum allowable term of inden­
ture. Thus, a 0-1 year lag is probably the proper lag, but 
there are no independent estimates of this lag and longer lags 
are quite possible. If a 0-1 year lag is correct, then 
tobacco prices have an insignificant effect on servant 
registrations. But for longer lags, the tobacco prices have 
a significant and negative impact on servant registration. 
Servant registration correlates negatively with English wages 
regardless of the lag used, which supports the findings of 
Tables VI and XX.1
An alternative model for determining tobacco prices which 
shows great promise, although there is no theoretical basis 
to justify it, is simply a function of the Bristol emigration 
list totals to the Chesapeake (1654-1686) lagged by five 
years, as listed in Table XXII. The relationship is also 
pictured in Figure VI.2 Along with a strong negative time 
trend, the negative correlation between this five-year lagged 
Bristol emigration and Chesapeake tobacco prices helps explain 
many of the fluctuations of tobacco prices in this time
Using a Chow test, the only model which shows signi­
ficant difference between the first half of the period 
(1660-1685) and the second half (1686-1706) is the 0 year lag 
case in which tobacco prices are positive and significant only 
in the second half.
2 Using Sargan’s test, all except the five-year lagged 
model was shown to have model specification errors at the 5% 
level of significance. The autocorrelation of the five-year 
lag model was determined to be an error specification problem 
and an autoregression with a one year lag produced model 5AR1, 
also listed in Table XX.
139
TABLE XXII
NOMINAL FARM TOBACCO PRICE (TOBO) AS FUNCTION OF LAGGED 
BRISTOL EMIGRATION TO THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE (BRIS-L), 1654-
1686
jag Constant BRIS-L YEAR D.W. R2
iars)
•k ★ * it
0 84.18 -1. 67 -0.049 0 .95 0 . 784
(10.1) (3.9) (9.9)
it * * *
1 70.37
<J\
0i—i1 -0.041 0 . 78 0 .716
(8.4) (2.5) (8.2)
* ir it
2 64 . 77 -0 . 79 -0.038 0 .81 0 .702
(8.1) (1.9) (7.9)
★ it * it
3 62 . 61 -0 .91 -0.037 0 . 85 0 . 748
(9.1) (2.6) (8.9)
★ * it it
4 54.27 -0 . 98 -0.032 0 . 82 0 . 859
(13.1) (4.6) (12.8)
★ * * it
5 45.88 -0. 79 -0.027 1. 44 0. 814
(11.1) (3.7) (10.9)
* * it
5AR1 44 . 19 -0 . 54 -0.026 — 0 .729
(8.6) (2.5) (8.4)
6 39 . 00 -0.59* -0.023* 1.2 0* 0 .728
(8.7) (2.5) (8.5)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Bristol headrights in thousands of headrights
Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses
Source: Tobacco prices (Menard,1973b,85)
Bristol emigration (A.E.Smith,309)
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period. Interestingly, as might be expected from the positive 
correlation between population change and tobacco prices, this 
five year lagged Bristol emigration also shows a strong 
negative correlation with population changes, as shown in 
Table XXIII.
Although Bristol emigration could easily represent a 
proxy for all English emigration and this emigration may be 
a better proxy for supply changes than the population and 
acreage totals used above, why lagged by five years? One 
possible explanation is the normal four or five year term of 
indenture. Perhaps indentured servants did not reach their 
productive capacity until after they were freed and working 
for themselves, although there is no evidence to support such 
a conclusion. Perhaps indentured servants generally left the 
county upon gaining their freedom or else competition for land 
between freedmen and other farmers caused a general exodus 
from the county. The freedmen may have left the colony for 
good or otherwise avoided being recorded or for other reasons 
simply were not recorded on county tithable lists. Although 
all of this is pure conjecture and the relationship may be 
totally coincidental, the strength of the fit (especially in 
comparison to other tobacco price models tested) demands 
additional study of the relationship between immigration and 
the tobacco economy.
But if immigration to the Chesapeake is negatively 
correlated with tobacco prices, and immigration was the
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TABLE XXIII
VIRGINIA TITHABLE POPULATION CHANGES (DPOP) 
AS FUNCTION OF BRISTOL EMIGRATION 
TO THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE (BRIS-L), 1654-1686
Lag Constant BRIS-L YEAR D.W.
(Years)
0 6658 -112.8 -3.76 1. 06*
(1.1) (0.4) (1.1)
1 7256 -35 . 0 -4 .  14 1. 28*
(1.2) (0.1) (1.1)
2 8963 -21.1 -5. 17 1. 18*
(1.4) (0.1) (1.3)
3 7181 -39 . 5 -4 . 11
*
1. 15
(1.1) (0.1) (1.1)
4 10021 -580.6 -5 . 74 1. 32*
(1.6) (1.8) (1.6)
* * ★ *
5 13525 -782.6 -7 . 82 1. 52
(2.2) (2.5) (2.2)
6 13893* -577 . 5 -8.07*
it
1. 35
(2.2) (1.7) (2.1)
R2
0. 041
0. 054
0. 068
0. 049
0. 138
0 .234
0. 171
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of 
significance
Note: Bristol headrights in thousands of headrights.
Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: Tithable population totals (Menard,1980,157-161) 
Bristol emigration (A.E.Smith,3 09)
greatest source of population increase in the 17th century, 
why is there a strong positive correlation between population 
increase and tobacco prices? Indeed, as shown in Table XXIV, 
this strong positive correlation holds for the entire time 
period 163 0-1730 although the relationship weakens signi­
ficantly with time. (English wages only seem to be signi­
ficant for the time period covered by the major part of this 
study.) Possibly the role of other components of population 
increase were more important than suspected. Most likely, 
people were less willing to emigrate from the colony when 
tobacco prices were high. Perhaps mortality was reduced when 
times were "good.” This analysis certainly indicates the need 
to take a closer look at population changes in the 17th 
century on a local and colony-wide level.
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TABLE XXIV
TITHABLE POPULATION CHANGE (DPOP) BY TIME PERIOD, 163 0-173 0
R2 
0 .309 
0. 455
Time Constant TOBO-O WAGE-1 YEAR D.W.
Period
1630-1730 -24284* 246.4* 0. 580 14 . 34* 1.40*
(4.7) (3.6) (0.6) (4.5)
1630-1660 -34995* 168 . 1* -0.276 21.23* 0 . 95*
(4.0) (4.2) (0.5) (3.9)
1660-1700 -20761* 712 . 7* -1.479 12 . 55*
★
1.41
(2.6) (2.7) (1.9) (2.8)
1700-1730 -18170 552 . 7 2 . 625 9.90 1. 53*
(0.5) (0.5) (1.1) (0.4)
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level of
significance
0 . 385
0. 131
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: Tithable population totals (Menard,1980,157-161) 
Tobacco prices (Menard,197 3b,85)
English wage index (Wrigley,642-643)
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Land acquisition in the colonial era has been relatively 
ignored by economic and social historians. Land was simply 
abundant and was not the limiting factor of production in a 
perpetually labor-short colonial society. Colonists could go 
out and get land when they wanted it. But this abundance is 
deceiving because new land was made available to the people 
only by the slow, methodical process of patenting. And, as 
this study has tried to show, the decision to patent land was 
not taken lightly.
This thesis has shown the value of using social science 
theory to structure historical analysis. Theory organizes 
research agendas by identifying historical topics which need 
more research and by providing a formal basis to develop hypo­
theses which can be systematically tested. The great advan­
tage of a study of land acqusition, to economists, demo­
graphers, and historians, is that it allows a chance to test 
social science theory much better than does most historical 
data. Land data is generally the best and most complete data 
from historical periods because of the ever-present concern 
over property rights. The ability to test such theories
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should help us to develop an understanding of historical 
causation, of why things happened the way they did.
Also I have strived to show how comparative analysis with 
the work done on other regions and time periods (for this 
study, colonial New England and the antebellum North and 
South) also can benefit studies of the colonial Chesapeake. 
With further study, the trend might be reversed so that other 
regions could benefit from work on the colonial Chesapeake. 
A comparison between two closely related historical periods 
can offer great insights to both periods.
Comparative analysis especially offers much hope for 
explorations into the interrelationships between the colonial 
and antebellum South. The economic studies of land acqusition 
in the antebellum South should be re-examined with considera­
tion of demographic factors. The two time periods should be 
treated as more continuous than discontinuous. Historians of 
both periods at least should no longer ignore the important 
work being done in the other.
There is little statistical evidence to support trans­
formation theories in the late 17th century Chesapeake. 
Neither land acquisition, annual population changes, unin­
dentured servant registrations, nor immigration showed any 
significant changes over the time period 1660-1706. However, 
there is some evidence of a "transformation" in the early 18th 
century provided by the study of annual population changes. 
Population change in the early 18th century became less
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dependent on fluctuations in the tobacco economy and English 
wage conditions, which could possibly reflect the growth of 
importance of natural increase and/or the major shift to slave 
labor, as Kulikoff has suggested.
This thesis shows that the interrelationship between 
economic and demographic forces in the 17th century Chesapeake 
were indeed complex. Although the econometric analysis of 
land acquisition finds that the Malthusian hypothesis is 
superior to the staples thesis, the effect of short-term 
fluctuations in the tobacco economy cannot be ignored. The 
analysis of alternative models indicates that further work is 
necessary before there will be a clear explanation of the 
economic behavior of tobacco planters and merchants. Addi­
tional effort should be devoted to continuing the work of 
Yasuba, Forster and Tucker, Rutman, and Easterlin in identi­
fying why population density is such a strong explanatory 
variable of early American economic and demographic develop­
ment .
Perhaps lower tobacco prices caused small freeholders 
and landless tenants, men with small ties to the local 
economy, to migrate out of the colony, thus retarding popul­
ation growth. But planters with great capital invested in 
the Chesapeake would have been unable to migrate and would 
even have been forced to import additional servants and slaves 
to maintain their cash flow, pay off their debts, and make up 
for the loss in the labor force due to out-migration. The
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further study of the interrelationship between immigration to 
the Chesapeake and the tobacco economy offers great promise. 
It is possible that all of the ups and downs of the tobacco 
economy were driven by changes in the immigration flow which 
were totally independent of planter behavior, or perhaps even 
exacerbated by planter behavior (if planters brought over more 
servants when tobacco prices were low).
Perhaps the Malthusian and staples hypotheses represent 
merely two sides of a complex, multi-faceted theory of human 
behavior. The Malthusian theory could explain intra-colonial 
migration and the staples theory could explain inter-colonial 
migration. The staples model reflects differences in oppor­
tunity between the tobacco economy and other colonial econo­
mies; the Malthusian model reflects differences in opportunity 
within the tobacco economy. Migration between England and the 
colonies might be explained by a combination of the two 
theories, since the colonies were both a part of and separate 
from the English economy.
Neither theory is complete in and of itself. Although 
Malthusian theory might predict the level of land acquisition 
or intra-colonial migration, this theory tells us little about 
the direction of that acquisition or migration in the colonial 
Chesapeake. For the staples theory, 17th century planters 
often did not respond as quickly or in the way that staples 
theory would predict. With more studies such as this, it may 
be possible for a more generalized theory to be developed
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which subsumes both the Malthusian and staples hypotheses, 
combines equally economic and demographic factors, and 
explains both individual and aggregate behavior.
APPENDIX I
NAMECODING SYSTEM AND ANALYSIS
Because of the vagaries of 17th century English ortho­
graphy and the peculiarities of 17th century English surnames, 
any computer data base analysis of individual land acquisition 
must include some sort of namecoding system. In trying to 
match individuals between two different records (for example, 
patent and patent or rent roll and patent) , I wanted to be 
sure that I did not miss possible individual matches yet, at 
the same time, it would have been too costly to go through all 
possible matches by hand to ensure that the matches were 
realistic.
If the data base is small enough, one simply could simply 
standardize the spelling of each name when entered. However, 
when the data base gets rather large, this practice becomes 
inefficient and impractical. Also, for the 17th century, I 
would be very hard pressed to determine the standard spelling 
of any surname due to the wide variety of surnames which are 
very uncommon in the modern United States.
The most common method of standardizing names is to use 
a coding system which reduces names to an alphanumeric code 
based on similar sounds of various letters or combinations of
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letters. The most often used coding system is the Soundex 
system developed for genealogical tracing of individuals in 
the 1880, 1900, and 1910 censuses. In the Soundex system,
"the surname is indexed by using the initial letter; the 
letter is followed by three numerical digits based on the 
consonants that follow the surname initial. Consonants that 
sound somewhat alike, though widely separated in the alphabet, 
are drawn together under one numeric code." The consonant 
groupings are: b,p,f,v; c,s,k,g,j,q,x,z; d,t; 1; m,n; r.
Vowels, unless initial, are not coded (Helmbold 54-55). 
Bouchard and Pouyez present an interesting description of 
alternative namecoding systems developed for French Quebec 
names (119-125).
Although I could have used the Soundex system as is, I 
found that it was both too much and too little. At least for 
17th century English surnames, the Soundex too often combined 
unsimilar names and missed similar names. The major problems 
were the loss of information with vowel elimination and the 
peculiar pronunciation of various consonant-consonant and 
vowel-consonant combinations in 17th century English speech.
Like the Soundex, I realized that the key to a good 
namecoding system was to envision each surname as code 
representing a combination of sounds. The written name, 
especially in the 17th century, is merely an approximation of 
an oral name and it is the oral name we need to try to 
recreate. Dictionaries of English pronunciation (Noory;
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Wright) were examined to identify problematic consonant and 
vowel sound groupings. Various 16th and 17th century English 
spelling-books (Fox and Hookes; Price; Bullokar) were studied 
to determine both 17th century "standard" English spelling and 
pronunciation and typical English spelling problems.
The most troublesome problem was consonants which changed 
their sound in various vowel-consonant and consonant-consonant 
combinations. This includes the standard English "soft" and 
"hard" consonants like "c","g", and "ch" but also some 
non-standard English variable-sound consonants. For anyone 
familiar with traditional southern speech, 17th century 
English pronunciation is not totally foreign. The most 
notorious consonant is "r" which is sometimes pronouced (after 
consonants and before vowels) and sometimes is not (before 
consonants and after vowels). The "r" also tends to convert 
all preceding vowels into a schwa. Similar problems arise for 
other consonants like "1", "m", and "n" in various combina­
tions with other consonants and vowels.
In studying English names, it was clearly obvious that 
the only important distinguishing vowel sounds were the 
initial vowel sound and a final, ending vowel sound (if the 
name ended in a vowel sound, such as BIGELOW). The prototype 
namecoding system included a vowel conversion routine which 
converted vowels in various vowel-vowel and vowel-consonant 
combinations to standard vowel sounds:
A = long A
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E = short A,E,I,Y
I = long E
0 = schwa, long 0, short 0,U
U = long U
Y = long I ,Y
However, after various tests, this vowel conversion 
routine was found to create as many problems as it solved. 
In reality, there is too much variety in spellings of various 
vowel sounds, and too much overlap in vowel sound groupings. 
Thus, in my final namecoding system I settled on two vowel 
sounds "E" (for long and short A,E,I & Y) and "O" (for schwa, 
long and short 0 & U) . I could have eliminated all vowel 
sounds like the Soundex, but the two-vowel system was found 
to be superior for reducing the number of misgroupings. Also 
more efficient than simply eliminating the vowel sound is to 
at least mark the location of the initial vowel sound to 
distinguish between such common initial consonant-vowel 
combinations as "BAL" and "BLA". All final, ending vowel 
sounds were simply reduced to "O".
My namecoding system, similar to the soundex, reduces 
consonants sounds down to numeric representation:
1 = B , P , F , V
2 = S,Z
3 = K, G , Q
4 = D, T
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5 = L
6 = M,N
7 = R
8 = W
9 = H
Particular attention was paid to defining the "R"," W " , and 
"H" sounds.
After deriving the basic formula, the namecoding routine 
was tested using various lists of problematic colonial 
Virginia and English surnames (Green; Hall; Bardsley; Ewer) 
and then fine tuned. As an example, after running through 
this namecoding routine, the name "MOUNTFORD" is converted to 
"M0614". The initial consonant is maintained; the vowel "OU" 
is reduced to "O"; the consonant combination "NTF" is reduced 
to "61" due to the tendency in the 17th English language to 
drop the middle consonant in a three-consonant combination 
headed by "M" or "N" ; the second vowel sound is dropped; and 
the final "RD" is converted to "4" due to the tendency for "R" 
after a vowel and before a consonant to blend into the final 
consonant. (This explanation is just a simplification of 
these conversions which occur in the namecoding routine, but 
give the basic gist.) In a similar way, the names "MANFORD," 
"MOMFORD," "MONTFORT," "MOUNFORD," "MOUNTFORT, 11 "MUMFORD," 
"MUMFORT," "MUMFORT," "MUMPFORD," and "MUNFORD," all of which 
appear in the patent records, are likewise reduced to "M0614". 
This agrees with B.W. Green's statement that the Virginia
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names spelled Montford or Munford was actually pronounced 
Mumford (15).
Finally, all of the available surnames in the patent 
records from 1660-17 06 were converted and the surname group­
ings analyzed for irregularities. These irregularities were 
then corrected using separate cross-reference tables for both 
names and codes. All given names and abbreviations of given 
names were standardized using a cross-reference table. For 
certain unusual given names, the patent records were searched 
to see if there were transcription or spelling errors. For 
all matching analysis, because of the uncertainty associated 
with surnames, it was absolutely critical to have standardized 
given names. The matches described in this report all 
required an exact match of both the given name and namecode 
(and sometimes county, date, or acreage). This double or 
triple matching eliminated most spurious matches since most 
given name-namecode combinations in 17th century Virginia were 
still rather unique due to the immigrant source and smallness 
of the population.
In practice, two different coding systems were developed, 
one for headright analysis and another for landowner analysis. 
The namecoding system described above was used for landowner 
analysis but a simplified, more generalized code was required 
for headright analysis due to greater variation in spelling 
of headright names. This was especially necessary for 
analysis of headrights who later became landowners to avoid
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missing a possible match. In this simplified code all vowels 
in the code were reduced to "E" and certain troublesome 
consonants ("W","H", final "S", final "R") were eliminated. 
Because this simplified code had a tendency to overmatch (to 
match unrelated names), this required a follow-up hand search 
through the derived name matches to eliminate unreasonable 
matches.
For the analysis of headright abuse of individual 
headrights, sensitivities were run eliminating namecodes of 
less than 3 or 4 characters (which were more likely to combine 
unrelated names), common namecodes like "S6E4" (Smith) and 
"B7E6" (Brown), and the most common given names (John, 
William, Thomas, Robert, Richard, Mary). The percentages were 
then prorated based on the size of the sample.
For the analysis of serial abuse in headrights, a 
headright was paired with the preceding headright (in the list 
contained within the patent) and then the paired headrights 
matched with similar paired headrights. Thus "Anne Green, 
Thomas Bowen" in one patent might be matched with "Ann Growen, 
Thom. Boon" in another patent. Each headright list was then 
examined for pattern of such matches, taking into account 
spelling or transcriptions errors (which were rampant in the 
headright lists) which might intermittently break the serial 
pattern.
APPENDIX II
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
This thesis employs multiple regression analysis des­
cribed in any standard statistics textbook (e.g., Maddala) . 
All models are expressed in the form of the algebraic equa­
tion:
Y = aO + al*Xl + a2*X2 + ... + an*Xn + u
where,
Y is the dependent variable (variable to be explained) 
on the left-hand side of the equation
Xl,...,Xn are the independent or explanatory variables 
on the right-hand side of the equation
aO is a constant coefficient (similar to the y-intercept 
in a simple algebraic equation)
al,...,an are the coefficients of the independent vari­
ables
u is the error term
Multiple regression analysis determines the coefficients 
aO,...,an which provide the "best fit" upon inserting sets of 
data into the equations. Since the data involved in this
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analysis is annual time series data, the "set of data" is that 
unique combination of dependent and independent variables 
which occur in any particular year, say 1696. However, when 
a lagged effect occurs, say when tobacco prices in 1696 affect 
land patent acquisition in 1698, then lagged independent 
variables are used, represented in the form Xn-L where L is 
the number of years of lag. Thus, tobacco prices in 1696 
lagged by two years (TOBO-2) are treated as if they were 
tobacco prices in 1698.
Since the calculated set of coefficients aO,...,an is 
only a "best fit," any particular set of data will rarely fit 
the equation perfectly so an error term u, which can be either 
positive or negative and differs for each set of data, is 
included in the equation.
The tables of multiple regression results list the values 
of the calculated coefficients aO,...,an, and list the 
t-statistics in parentheses underneath each coefficient. A 
t-statistic is the measure of confidence that the listed 
coefficient is not merely random (i.e., is significantly 
different than zero), and is calculated by dividing the 
coefficient by the standard deviation of the coefficient. 
For most analyses presented here, t-statistics of 2 or greater 
indicate that there is statistically less than a 5% chance 
that the coefficient is purely random. Lower t-statistics 
indicate a much greater chance of randomness and 5% is 
considered by most econometricians the maximum degree of
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chance acceptable when assessing statistical significance. 
Coefficients that have less than a 5% chance of being random 
and are thus statistically significant at the 5% level of 
significance are specially indicated by an *. T-statistics 
are listed as absolute values (without + or - signs) simply 
for ease of reading, because the t-statistic will always have 
the same sign as the coefficient.
A measure commonly presented in econometric analyses is 
the R2 statistic, which is a measure of the fraction of 
variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the 
"best fit" equation. Normally the higher the R2 the better 
the model, but the R2 statistic can be quite deceiving and is 
not a proper statistic for judging the statistical signifi­
cance of a model because it heavily dependent on the type of 
model and data being tested. A model which uses a lot of 
individual level data and has an R2 of 0.15 may be much better 
than a model which uses aggregated data and has an R2 of 0.90. 
However, when comparing two similar models using the same 
data, R2 provides a quick check of which is the better model.
Because we are dealing with time series data which often 
tends to be cyclical in nature, one of the most important 
statistics in every table presented is the Durbin-Watson or 
D.W. statistic. A major assumption of multiple regression 
analysis is that the error term (u) for any set of data should 
be random. For annual time series data, however, this year's 
error term is often related to last year's error term. For
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example, if last year's prediction was high, then this year's 
prediction might tend to be high. If the model tends to 
overpredict for a few years and then underpredict for a few 
years, this is called positive autocorrelation which is the 
most common problem in normal time series data. (If the model 
bounces back and forth every year between overprediction and 
underprediction, this is called negative autocorrelation which 
is much less common.) Often the problem occurs because the 
independent variable cycles continually lag behind or lead the 
dependent variable cycles and so the cycles never synchronize. 
Autocorrelation could be due to problems either with the model 
(model specification error) or with the data (error specifica­
tion error) and there are statistical ways to test for this, 
such as Sargan's test (Maddala 210). For most of the models 
presented here, the model is the problem. When dealing with 
lagged effects, the most likely cause of model error leading 
to autocorrelation is choosing the wrong lag time.
The Durbin-Watson coefficient is a measure of autocor­
relation on a scale of 0 to 4 with 0 (perfect positive 
autocorrelation), 2 (no autocorrelation) and 4 (perfect
negative autocorrelation). As with t-statistics, we are 
interested in when the odds of autocorrelation being problema­
tic have less than a 5% chance of being random. This depends 
heavily on the length of the time series and the number of 
independent variables in the model. For the models and data 
examined in this paper, positive autocorrelation generally
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becomes problematic when the Durbin- Watson statistic falls 
below about 1.6.
Other statistical techniques are discussed in the 
appropriate footnotes.
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